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ABSTRACT 
Loy Wesley Henderson was the Director of the Office of 
Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) in the Department of 
State from 1945-1948. A veteran Soviet observer, he persis-
~ 
tently called for the use of economic aid in the Near East to 
increase American prestige and prevent Soviet expansion. 
Believing that American principles and national interests 
should be the basis of foreign policy rather than partisan 
politics, Henderson was a leading influence in the formula-
tion of the Truman Doctrine but disagreed with the Truman 
Administration's support of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
This work examines Henderson's views on United States 
foreign policy, its formulation, and goals, illustrating his 
devotion to that which he perceived as moral. ·In analyzing 
Henderson's record on the formulation of the Truman Doctrine 
and Palestine policy, it is evident that he remained true to 
beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign service background and 
brought to the fore by the Cold War. 
Primary sources utilized include the Loy W. Henderson 
Papers. This collection was especially significant because 
Henderson disagreed with the accounts of Joseph Jones and 
George Kennan concerning the events surrounding the formula-
tion of the Truman Doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Former State Department official Louis J. Halle, in the 
Preface of his book, The Cold ~~ as Hist£.E_Y, wrote, "The 
essence of history, in a certain view, is the contrast bet-
ween the immensity of its movement and the limitations of the 
individuals who, often with the greatest gallantry, put them-
selves at grips with it."(l) Loy Wesley Henderson was one of 
these gallant individuals. For thirty-nine years he faced 
the tide of events as a foreign service officer in the Baltic 
States, Moscow, the Near East, India, and Washington. At 
each stop along the way, Henderson left his mark, a mark that 
resulted in praise, criticism, and usually a great deal of 
controversy. 
The most controversial years of Henderson's long career 
were 1945-1948 when he served as Director of the Office of 
Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) . Events in the post-
war years were developing and changing rapidly with the com-
mencement of the Cold War, and as the importance of the Near 
East became more apparent, the Director of NEA came to the 
fore. Henderson played a hero's role in the drama that led 
to the Truman Doctrine but was cast in the part of villain in 
the Palestine tragedy. Thirty years later, he wrote, "More 
(1) Louis J. Halle, !he f£!~ ~~ ~~ Hist.£_Ey (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p. xii. 
1 
criticism has been aimed at me for what I did during my three 
years as Director for Near East and Africa than for what I 
did during all the other years in the Service."(2) 
The criticism came from all quarters and on all issues. 
Isolationists accused Henderson and other State Department 
officials of leading the United States to the brink of an-
other world war when the President presented the Truman 
Doctrine challenge to the nation. Cold War critics viewed 
the Director's anti-Soviet opinions as inflammatory and 
unnecessary. Indeed, Henderson was never a favorite in Mos-
cow, as he noted in 1961, "The Russians consider me as one of 
the most dangerous American undercover agents. . During 
the period 1945-8 I opposed them vigorously. • " ( 3) No 
issue, however, aroused more intense criticism than the crea-
tion of the state of Israel. Henderson's opposition to 
United States support of Palestine as a Jewish national home 
drew charges of anti-Semitism and disloyalty. The contro-
versy surrounding his attitude resulted in his "promotion" 
out of NEA in the summer of 1948. 
Henderson survived the NEA battles and became a highly 
decorated civil servant. In 1954, he received the Distin-
guished Service Award, the highest State Department honor, 
(2) Loy Henderson to Alfred Lilienthal, March 13, 1977, 
Container 11 of 28, Loy W. Henderson Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
(3) ~oy Henderson to William Benton, March 12, 1961, 
William Benton File, 1969-73, Container 1, LWH Papers. 
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and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civil 
Service in 1958 before retiring from public life in 1960. (4) 
From his colleagues Henderson received much praise and admir-
ation. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to him, 
"Your devotion to duty, your moral integrity and your per-
sonal sacrifices have set an example for the entire Foreign 
Service."(5) Henderson was dedicated, energetic, and coura-
geous in performing his duties. He was a man of principles 
first and foremost. He never hesitated to speak his mind and 
often paid the price for his forthrightness. (6) This devo-
tion to principle and to pursuing the interests of the United 
States in the postwar world l~d ultimately to his fall from 
grace with the Truman Administration. As George Kennan 
wrote, "The process of government, after all, is a practical 
exercise and not a moral one."(7) 
Loy Henderson never believed in sacrificing the moral 
for the practical. This work examines Henderson's views on 
United States foreign policy, its formulation, and goals, 
(4) United States Department of State, Th~ ~io~Ehi£ 
~~gi_~~~ !960 (Washington: Government ·Printing Office, 1960), 
p. 3. 
(5) John Foster Dulles to Loy Henderson,. June 27, 1957, 
Secretaries of State File, 1957-69, Container 2, LWH Papers. 
(6) William Benton to Graham H. Stuart, July 16, 1953, 
and William Benton to Loy Henderson, July 14, 1967, Benton 
File, LWH Papers. 
(7) George F .. Kennan, Realities of American Forei9:!!_ 
Po!i£Y (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 48. 
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illustrating his devotion to that which he perceived as 
moral. In analyzing Henderson's record on the formulation of 
the Truman Doctrine and Palestine policy, it is evident that 
he remained true to beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign ser-
vice backgrnnnd and brought to the fore by the Cold War. His 
foremost concern was United States interests, not public or 
presidential opinion. 
The source materials for Henderson's views and policy 
contributions are numerous. Many Cold War authors sought his 
opinions through interviews and occasionally the perusal of 
his private correspondence. (8) Others merely mention Hender-
son, a witness to the tide of events but not a major partici-
pant in them. (9) This work focuses on Loy Henderson's unique 
(8) Bruce R. Kuniholm, Th~ Origins of the Cold War i~ !~~ 
~~~~st (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
Joseph M. Jones, !he Fifteen Weeks (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, Inc., 1955), and Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Pales-
!ine~ g£~ the U.S. ~ to Recognize Israel (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1979) are typical of those who include 
Henderson in their narratives. Kuniholm and Jones rightly 
credit Henderson with a major role in the formulation of the 
Truman Doctrine, while Wilson recounts Henderson's role in 
the formulation of Palestine policy. Kuniholm had access to 
some of Henderson's private papers prior to their transfer to 
the Library of Congress in 1981, but he does not cite them as 
a primary source. 
(9) John L. Gaddis, !he Qnite£ States and !he Origins of 
!he fold ~~E !941-12.il. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972) and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, the ~is~ ~en: ~ix 
Kriends ~£ th~ World They ~ad~ (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1986) are typical of those who neglect Henderson's role 
in policy formulation. Gaddis only briefly mentions Hender-
son's contribution to Cold War policy, while Isaacson and 
Thomas are typical of those who neglect Henderson's role in 
policy formulation. 
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role in American foreign affairs from 1945 to 1948 as 
revealed in public documents and his personal papers. For-
~ign Relations of the United States is the primary source of 
Henderson's statements on policy issues. The Papers of Loy 
W. Henderson, however, provide fresh insight into the man 
behind the public figure. Housed in the Manuscript Division 
of the Library of Congress and made available to the public 
in 1986, these papers consist of approximately eight thousand 
items stored in twenty-eight containers. They cover the 
years 1918 through 1978 with the late 1930s to late 1950s the 
dominant period. Henderson's fifteen hundred page unpub-
lished memoirs are a part of the collection, but he stipu-
lated the draft remain restricted until two years after his 
death (1988) The memoirs, however, tell his story only up 
to 1942. 
While the papers provide little information on Hender-
son's personal life, his correspondence discloses his beliefs 
and ideals in a manner not conveyed by the words attributed 
to him in secondary sources. Henderson stated numerous times 
his dislike of personal interviews and his hesitancy to be 
quoted. He felt the inte~viewer seldom imparted the true 
meaning of his words. (10) The Henderson Papers provide for 
(10) See Loy Henderson to Mr. Quandt, April 11, 1969, 
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, Container 11, LWH 
Papers; Loy w. Henderson Interview, October 15, 1975, Israel-
Palestine Coriespondence File, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson 
to Sister M. Agatha Aicher, June 6, 1949, Lilienthal File, 
LWH Papers. 
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the first time the personal written words of Loy Henderson, 
words which he carefully chose to express clearly his ideas 
and beliefs. While the reader is as free as the interviewer 
to interpret the meaning of words, there is less chance of 
misrepresentation of the written source. 
Perhaps of greater importance, the Henderson Papers shed 
new light on some important topics. Loy Henderson disagreed 
with the accounts of Joseph Jones and George Kennan concern-
ing the events surrounding the formulation of the Truman 
Doctrine, especially the role played by Kennan. Upon reading 
a draft of a portion of Kennan's memoirs, Henderson composed 
a four page letter to his long-time friend recalling in 
detail the events of that fateful weekend in February 1947, 
which are discussed herein in Chapter III. In this letter 
written April 2, 1967, Henderson stated, " the decision 
to render aid to Greece and Turkey was made before you were 
brought into the consultations."(11) Marginal notes and 
other correspondence indicate that Henderson never mailed 
this letter. He sent to Kennan on April 28 a much abbre-
viated and less emotional version. Kennan acknowledges in 
his memoirs Henderson's differing recollections but views 
them as inconsequential. The Henderson Paperi reveal that 
ten years later Henderson disputed Clark Clifford's oral 
(11) Loy Henderson to 
(apparently never mailed), 
Papers. 
George Kennan, April 2, 1967 
Greece File, Container 8, LWH 
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account of the 1947-1948 Palestine crisis, discussed herein 
in Chapter IV. In a letter to Dean Rusk, he privately 
answered Clifford's charges and highlighted their inaccura-
cies; however, Henderson made no public denouncement of the 
Clifford speech. (12) 
The papers also provide unparalleled information on the 
career of this influential officer. As detailed later in 
this work, Loy Henderson left his mark from.Washington to 
India. As a tribute to Henderson, the State Department audi-
torium bears his name. So profound was his influence on the 
foreign service that William Benton, former Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Public Affairs, suggested this obituary, 
"Here lies the man most respected by his peers and regarded 
as the Dean of the Foreign Service for his distinguished 
attainments and contributions."(13) 
(12) See George F. Kennan, MemoirsL 1925-1950 (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Company, 1967), p. 314; and Loy Henderson to 
Dean Rusk, November 20, 1977, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers. 
(13) William Benton to Loy Henderson, February 17, 1971, 
Benton File, LWH Papers. 
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CHAPTER I 
EARLY CAREER: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS 
When Loy Henderson came to the Office of Near Eastern 
and African Affairs in April 1945, he possessed a wealth of 
experience earned in over twenty-five years of service to his 
country. Born in Rogers, Arkansas on June 28, 1892, he was a 
student at Northwestern University when World War I broke 
out. Upon receiving his A.B. degree in 1915, Henderson 
attended the University of Denver Law School for one year 
before entering graduate school at New York University. When 
the United States entered the war, Henderson appliJf for but 
was denied ·entrance to the First Officers' Training Camp 
because of a stiff arm, the result of a childhood break. 
Desiring to serve his country in some way, Henderson joined 
the American Red Cross and was stationed in France in 
1918. (1) 
In February of 1919, as a commissioned officer in the 
then militarized Red Cross in Europe, Henderson went to 
Berlin as a member of the Inter-Allied Commission to Germany. 
His duties were to inspect prisoner of war camps and facili-
(1) See ~i£~E£ic ~~~is~, p. 3; Biographic Notes, 
Container 1, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to David Chalfan, 
December 26, 1974, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, Con-
tainer 5, LWH Papers. 
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tate the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. He moved 
even closer to the Russian situation in the fall of 1919 when 
he went to Riga as a member of the American Red Cross Commis-
sion to Western Russia and the Baltic States. Besides the 
hardships which resulted from the continued fighting, the Red 
Cross encountered a raging typhus epidemic in Estonia. Dur-
ing these months, however, Henderson developed a love and 
deep respect for the Baltic people. His stay in Riga was 
brief, and in April of 1920 he returned to Berlin where he 
served until August 1921 as head of the Office of the Ameri-
can Red Cross. (2) 
Loy Henderson's first foreign service post was in Dub-
lin. His first Washington assignment came in 1925 in the 
Division of East European Affairs, but by 1927 he was back in 
Riga as the Third Secretary of the Legation to the Baltic 
States, assigned to the Russian Division. Since the United 
States did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR, the 
Russian Division observed Soviet activities from its vantage 
point in the Baltics. The situation gave Henderson an oppor-
tunity to make a marked impression on his superiors ~bile 
serving in this area. In reports to Secretary of State Henry 
L. Stimson, Louis Sussdorff, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, ad 
interim, noted the junior officer's energy, strength, and 
(2) See Bio~~E!:!i:.£ ~~£~~, p. 3; Biographic Notes, LWH 
Papers; and Interview with Loy Henderson, March 1975, for The 
GO£~ ~~i£h£££, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, LWH 
Papers. 
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ability to inspire his co-workers. In addition Henderson 
displayed enormous executive skills as well as the ability to 
study and analyze the complex Soviet situation. (3) Sussdorff 
concluded one memorandum to the State Department: 
I desire to state that both Mr. Macgowan [in 
charge of the Russian Division] and I feel that in 
our fifteen years experience in the foreign service 
we have never been associated with any junior off i-
cer who has possessed greater ability and energy as 
a political and economic reporter than Mr. Hender-
son. (4) 
Henderson learned a great deal about the Soviet Union 
during his three years in Riga; therefore, he was selected to 
participate in the first diplomatic mission to the Soviet 
Union in 1934 as Second Secretary of the Embassy. Approxi-
mately forty men went to Moscow with Ambassador William 
Bullitt. Bullitt's post-World War I attempt to bring the 
Soviet Union into the Paris Peace Conference had been humili-
atinily ignored by the Allies, who had sent him to negotiate 
with Lenin, so the Ambassador went to Moscow with a great 
deal of hope for the future of Soviet-American relations. 
These hopes soon were shattered. The cruelties, unscrupu-
lousness, dishonesty, and degradation of the Soviet govern-
ment left a lasting impression on all members of the American 
mission. These characteristics resulted in Heriderson and 
(3) See Biographic Notes, LWH Papers; Kuniholm, Cold ~~ 
in Near East, pp. 238-40; and Louis Sussdorff, Jr. to Henry 
L. Stimson,-March 6, 1930, Baltic States File, Container 6, 
LWH Papers. 
(4) Sussdorff to Stimson, March 6, 1930, LWH Papers. 
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other embassy officials advising President Roosevelt to 
take a hard line. When the President rejected this policy, 
Bullitt resigned in 1936. (5) 
Since Bullitt was seldom in Moscow during his final 
year as ambassador, administration of the embassy was left to 
the Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, Loy Henderson. Under 
Henderson's direction, the embassy developed into one of the 
most respected and informed missions in the Soviet Union. He 
impressed those around him with his dedication, intelligence, 
sincerity, and courage. Like others in the embassy, he was 
appalled by the Soviet police state and became convinced that 
ultimate Soviet aims were in direct opposition to American 
goals and principles. Both George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, 
who gained fame as Soviet experts, were with Henderson in 
Moscow. They acknowledged the profound influence which Hen-
derson had on their careers and the development of their 
ideas. ( 6) Kennan expressed these ideas eloquently in 1946-
1947, detailed herein in Chapter II, but in 1936 it was 
Henderson who wrote to ~ecretary of State Cordell Hull: 
I am convinced . that the establishment of a 
Union of World Soviet Socialist Republics is still 
the ultimate objective of Soviet foreign policy . 
. it is my belief . . that this objective is a 
(5) Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 63, 69-70, 80-81. 
(6) See Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 34-35, 61, 63-64, 81, 84; 
and Charles E. Bohlen, Witness 1£ ~istory ~ 1929-1969 (New 
York: w. w. Norton & Company, 1973), pp. 17-18, 39-41, 121, 
125. 
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real one at the present time and is not to be 
ignored in discussions of Soviet-American rela-
tions. (7) 
Henderson informed the Secretary in the same message that he 
believed the Kremlin used its international organizations to 
take advantage of the rebellious and discontented elements of 
other nations in order to strengthen the Soviet position in 
these countries. (8) 
Henderson's warning appeared to fall on deaf ears in 
Washington, and the embassy staff was dismayed when Roosevelt 
appointed Joseph E. Davies to replace Bullitt as ambassador. 
They regarded Davies as unqualified for the post and believed 
that the appointment was politically motivated. They were 
deeply disappointed that the President seemed to place so 
little importance on the mission, and some, including Hender-
son, considered resigning from the foreign service. Hender-
son decided to remain despite the changes in information 
analysis and reporting techniques required by the."newspaper 
image" of Mr. Davies .. Choosing to discuss issues with the 
press rather than his staff, Mr. Davies attempted to make 
Soviet-American relations appear cordial and to obscure the 
differences. In addition to the anxiety owing to these 
policy changes, Henderson became increasingly concerned with 
(7) Loy Henderson to Cordell Hull, November 16, 1936, 
United States Department of State, K.£.E.~i~ Relations of the 
~~ite£ ~!~tes: The Soviet UnionL !111.-191.2. (Washington, 
1952), pp. 310-11. 
(8) Ibid., p. 313. 
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Washington's neglect of the embassy. Repeating a common 
diplomatic grievance, Henderson complained about the reduc-
tion of the budget and staff and the insufficient pay of 
those who remained. (9) 
Despite their differences, Henderson and Davies devel-
oped a cordial relationship. The same, however, was not true 
of Henderson's relationship with the Soviets. According to 
Philip J. Baram, Henderson stated that Soviet Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov informed Eleanor Roosevelt 
that the American charge d'affaires was an obstacle to 
Soviet-America~ friendship and urged his removal. Thus, 
unwelcome in the Soviet Union, Henderson left this dis-
tressful situation in March 1938, and shortly thereafter 
became assistant chief in the Office of European Affairs. 
His return to Washington did not lessen his concern about the 
USSR, as his main areas of responsibility was the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. In a 1939 memorandum he again 
commented ori what he termed the Soviet "spirit of aggressive-
ness." As the United States became involved in World War II, 
Henderson urged the government to look at Soviet-American 
relations realistically. He pointed out that the Soviets were 
challenging the independence of Finland, the Baltic States, 
and Poland. Henderson did not understand how the Roosevelt 
(9) See Kennan, Memoir~, pp. 82-83; 
George S. Messersmith, February 5, 1938, 
smith File, Container 1, LWH Papers. 
and Loy Henderson to 
George S. Messer-
13 
Administration could be so blind and compliant with Soviet 
aggression. (10) Prompted by the attempt of Soviet troops in 
the Baltic States to install puppet governments, he asked, 
"Is the Government of the United States to apply certain 
standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany 
and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet 
Union? ."(11) In the same memorandum, he suggested that 
United States refusal to acknowledge these Soviet conquests 
might prove useful when negotiating a settlement for the 
postwar world. According to Henderson, American communists 
and liberals viewed his advice "to adopt a firm stand" as an 
attempt to sabotage presidential policy. Because his views 
were in disagreement with the administration, Henderson 
requested transfer from the Soviet field in 1943. (12) 
Charles Bohlen would later write, "With the departure of 
Henderson, the Soviet field lost one of its founders, 
(10) See Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of 
~h~ Cold War and the Nati£nal Security State (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 33-34; Loy Henderson to James 
C. Dunn and John D. Hickerson,. July 22, 1939, FRUSL. Soviet 
Unio.!!L. 1933-1939, p. 773; Philip J. Baram, Th~ De£artment £! 
~~~te in the Middle Ea~ 1919-1945 (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 77; Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 
132-33; and Memorandum by Loy Henderson, July 15, 1940, 
Baltic States File, LWH Papers. 
(11) Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 1940, LWH Papers. 
(12) See Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 1940, LWH 
Papers; Loy Henderson to Blake Ehrlich, March 31, 1948, 
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Bohlen, 
~itn~ to History, p. 125. 
14 
a man who probably did as much for the Foreign Service as any 
officer, living or dead."(13) 
Removed from the area he knew best, Loy Henderson pro-
ceeded to learn about another part of the world. He accepted 
the ranking post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentary to Iraq in July 1943. Although the first state of 
the mandated territory to receive independence in 1930, Iraq 
was still very much under the influence of Great Britain. 
Henderson was quite conscious of British interests in the 
Persian Gulf and of the concern which British officials felt 
about the growing American influence. He walked a tight 
line, strengthening American ties through oil concessions 
while not alarming the British. His interests in the area 
were more than political, however. During his term in Iraq, 
Henderson tried to learn as much as possible about the cul-
tures and religions of this unique group of people. He was 
especially interested in the Shias and their beliefs. In the 
spring of 1944, Henderson toured the Shia holy cities in an 
attempt to better understand the Sunni-Shia schism. (14) 
His knowledge of the Near East and its people proved to 
be useful in his next assignment. On April 17, 1945, less 
than a week after President Roosevelt's death, ·Henderson 
(14) See Don Peretz,~ !:!iddl~ ~ast To~, 3d ed. (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978), pp. 408, 417; and Loy 
Henderson to corde~l Hull, March 1944 and May 1944, Iraq 
Miscellany File, Container 10, LWH Papers. 
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became the new Director of the Off ice of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs. Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern 
Division of NEA, was the logical choice to succeed Wallace 
Murray, but his tenure in the foreign service was not as long 
nor his personality as "dynamic" as Henderson's. Murray and 
Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew held Henderson in 
high esteem and believed he deserved the appointment. (15) 
When Henderson returned to the State Department in the 
spring of 1945, the United States was in a state of shock 
over the death of President Roosevelt. For the first time in 
twelve years, someone new stood at the head of the government 
at a moment when the nation needed experienced leadership in 
world affairs. Presidents shape foreign policy, but Harry 
Truman possessed little experience in such matters. The 
primary task of the State Department was to provide the new 
president with the most accurate and up-to-date information 
on the world situation and United States foreign rela-
tions. (16) 
During most of the next three years Henderson spent in 
Washington, the hierarchy of the Department of· State con-
sisted of the secretary of state, the under secretary of 
state, the directors of the territorial offices, the chiefs 
of the geographical divisions within each territory, and the 
92. 
16 
country desk officers. The under secretary, especially dur-
ing the term of Secretary of State George Marshall, was 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the department. 
The General was accustomed to delegating authority as well 
as seeking advice fiom subordinates, practices which he 
brought to the St~t~ Department. Marshall also encouraged 
personnel of. the department to anticipate and plan for future 
events. Henderson acquired this habit early in his career 
and easily utilized it in his new post. (17) 
The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was one 
of the four territorial offices of the Department of State. 
Each office was responsible for a particular part of the 
world, assisting the government in the formulation and coor-
dination of United States policies and actions in the speci-
fie region. NEA covered an area of thirteen million square 
miles and included eighteen Near Eastern countries and all 
but two African nations. The 600 million people ranged from 
the world's richest to poorest. To handle this vast terri-
tory, NEA was divided into three geographical divisions each 
headed by a Division Chief. Within each division there were 
"country desks" where concerns were even more specialized. 
It was imperative that the Director of the Off ice, the Chiefs 
of Divisions, and the desk officers understand the govern-
(17) See Interview with Loy W. Henderson, October 15, 
1975, Israel-Palestine Correspondence, LWH Papers; and Bal-
four, ~£~ ~£~~£~~ri~~' p. 81. 
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ment's foreign policies both in general and as regarded their 
special area or country. (18) 
This knowledge was necessary to insure the proper hand-
ling of all situations from the sublime to the ridiculous, 
and some of the routine work did seem ridiculous in compari-
son with the more pressing issues of the day. While Hender-
son spent the majority of his time on crises in Iran, Turkey, 
Greece, and Palestine, he also had to tend to the needs of 
the various diplomatic missions of his territory, including 
staffing problems, salaries, and housing. Of particular 
concern to Henderson were the rights of Americans living and 
traveling abroad, such as the question of whether American 
citizens should be tried under Saudi Arabian laws. Some 
issues were of importance to diplomatic relations but were 
not of the crisis variety. These included such things as the 
recommendation to elevate the Consulate in Tunisia to a 
Consulate General and the approval of a visit to the United 
States by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. (19) 
Henderson had well-developed ideas concerning the 
nature of American foreign policy and how this policy should 
be applied to all aspects of diplomatic relations whether 
large or small. He believed that there were two categories 
(18) United States Department of State, Foreig£ Poli= 
ci~~~ Their Formulation and Enforcement, by Loy W. Henderson 
(Washington: Government ~inting Office, 1946), pp. 8-13. 
(19) Miscellaneous Memoranda, Near Eastern Affairs, 
1945-48, Substantive File, Container 12, LWH Papers. 
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of American policies. Long-term policies were stable and 
permanent, based on lasting American tradition. Short-term 
policies were extensions of the long-term policies that were 
formulated to meet specific world situations. He felt that 
each decision of the State Department should comply with 
these policies and the will of the American people. Conflict 
between policy and public opinion should receive the special 
attention of the Secretary of State and the President. (20) 
Henderson believed that the principles embodied in Amer-
ican tradition, rather than shortsighted objectives, should 
be the basis of United States foreign policy. While he 
acknowledged the claim of political theorists that blind 
devotion to principle led to inflexibility and the inability 
to bargain in foreign relations, Henderson feared the conse-
quences of a policy guided only by opportunism. He stated: 
I urge that . you bear in mind that if the 
United States in pursuit of its objectives -
regardless how noble these objectives may be -
jettisons the principles on which it was founded 
and on which our democratic and free society is 
based, we may well· dissipate our national purpose 
and find ourselves helplessly and aimlessly adrift 
in a sea of opportunism. . (21) 
Henderson was well aware of the difficulties of pursuing such 
an idealistic policy in the real world, but he believed that 
(20) Henderson, Foreign Policies, pp. 2-5. 
(21) Loy w. Henderson, "The Foreign Service and the 
World Struggle," First Carr Memorial Lecture presented at 
Wagner College, 3 June 1962, in Foreign Service Correspon-
dence File, Container 7, LWH Papers. 
19 
choices based on traditional principles and American inter-
ests would result in the best foreign policy decisions. It 
was important, therefore, that the United States persevere in 
its pursuit of a policy based on principle and not be lulled 
into destructive compromises due to the weariness brought on 
by hard negotiations. Such compromises usually resulted in 
only "an illusory relaxation of tensions."(22) 
Henderson realized that it was the President who deter-
mined United States foreign policy, based on his foreign 
relation objectives, the advice of counselors and officials, 
and subject to Congressional approval and public opinion. 
Henderson believed, however, that the State Department played 
a very important and definite role in the formulation of this 
foreign policy. It was the duty of each territorial off ice 
to gather and analyze information from the diplomatic mis-
sions and other sources. The Director would then convey his 
staff's opinion to the Secretary of State. This opinion 
should be based on a thqrough professional assessment of the 
facts devoid of influence from emotions or political pres-
sures. Henderson felt that the Secretary and President 
should always receive the department's honest opinions, even 
if they were contrary to the beliefs of the administration 
and/or the American public. Foreign Service officers had to 
perform their duty regardless of criticism. The department, 
(22) Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. 
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however, should implement whatever policy evolved regardless 
of its compliance with its recommendations, for the depart-
ment served the President. During the Palestine affair, 
detailed herein in Chapter IV, critics accused Henderson and 
NEA of failing to implement properly Truman's Palestine pol-
icy. Henderson vigorously denied these charges of disloy-
alty. (23) 
His belief that the gathering of accurate information 
was vitally important to the territorial offices brought 
Henderson into rare contention with Under Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson. In 1946 Acheson supported the Budget Bureau's 
reorganization plan which called for an Office of" Research 
and Intelligence. Under the new organization, this off ice 
would gather and analyze all information and issue informa-
tion to the geographic offices on request. The primary 
responsibility of the geographic offices would be to engage 
in "operations." Henderson and Assistant Secretary for 
Administration Donald Russell opposed the reorganization. 
Henderson did not believe that information-gathering should 
be removed from the geographic offices. These offices were 
uniquely qualified to analyze information since each had 
intimate knowledge of the people, culture, and conditions in 
their countries as well as the diplomatic missions located 
there. In order for personnel in these offices to perform 
(23) See Henderson to Ehrlich, March 31, 1948, LWH 
Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. 
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their duties, they needed firsthand rather than distilled 
information, and he believed it was necessary for them to 
help determine the type of research to be conducted. (24) 
Acheson referred to this opposition as· "civil disobe-
dience in the State Department," but Secretary of State James 
F. Byrnes approved Russell's modified reorganization plan, 
which was acceptable to Henderson and the geographic offices. 
The Off ice of Research and Intelligence would carry out its 
function through new research divisions assigned to each 
geographic office. Henderson later recalled that its primary 
function was to coordinate technically the Department's 
information-gathering as well as to engage in its own 
research. The new office necessitated the new post of Spe-
cial Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelli-
gence. Acheson, however, disliked the reorganization, and 
Henderson believed the Under Secretary took advantage of the 
resignation of Byrnes in 1947 to change the Department's 
intelligence operation at the expense of the geographic 
offices. (25) 
Henderson behaved in his customary manner during this 
situation. He gave his honest opinion regardless of the 
(24) See Loy 
13, 1954, Foreign 
and Dean Acheson, 
~!~te DeE_artment 
pp. 158-61. 
Henderson to J. c. Satterthwaite, September 
Service Correspondence File, LWH Papers; 
Pre~nt ~ ~ Creation: ~~ !~~~ !~ !h~ 
(New York: W. w. Norton & Company, 1969), 
(25) See Henderson to Satterthwaite, 
and Acheson, Pr~!~!!~ Creation, pp. 
September 13, 
158-61, 170. 
1954; 
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opposition. According to Henderson, Acheson found his objec-
tions disturbing; however, it did not appear to interfere 
with their working relationship on other issues. Acheson 
wrote in his memoirs that Henderson was an "entirely loyal 
and competent officer."(26) As a dedicated State Department 
official, Acheson probably understood Henderson's compulsion 
to air his honest beliefs. He depended on Henderson's candor 
in the early stages of the Cold War. 
(26) See Henderson to Satterthwaite, September 13, 1954; 
and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 158-161, 170. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COLD WAR SETTING 
1945-1948 
In the November 1, 1954, issue of !ime, a brief article 
appeared in the "Foreign Relations" section announcing the 
presentation of the Distinguished Service Award to Loy Hen-
derson. The title of the article was "Honor for a Cold 
Warrior." At the height of Cold War rhetoric in the United 
States, Time portrayed Henderson as a paragon of free world 
virtues, a fighter for the cause. But what was the cause? 
What was the Cold War and how did it start?(l) 
The label "Cold War" was coined in 1947 by columnist 
Walter Lippmann to describe the faltering relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The title was 
unique, but the situation was not. Powerful states. have 
always had difficulty living and working together. Differ-
ences in ideology, culture, language, and political goals 
have invariably led to rivalry and conflict with each side 
blaming the other. The most obvious difference between the 
Cold War and history's hot wars was the inconsequence of 
military encounters, but the other elements of war were 
p~esent - arms build-up, name-calling, public fear and patri-
(1) "Honor For a Cold Warrior," !i.!!!~· November 1, 1954, 
p. 2 0. 
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otism. The war, however, did not begin with a single shot 
heard around the world. Instead it evolved gradually from 
wartime alliance to postwar hostility. (2) 
The early stages of World War II had pointed out the 
military weakness of the Allies. They needed Soviet help, 
and it did not come cheaply. Roosevelt followed hopefully a 
policy of fostering Stalin's personal trust. Henderson cau-
tioned the administration to be wary of Soviet conduct, but 
there was little sense outside of the State Department ~hat 
the Soviet Union represented a threat to United States inter-
ests and principles. (3) As John L. Gaddis noted, "Through a 
curious kind of illogic the Russians' vigorously successful 
resistance to Hitler purified them ideologically in the eyes 
of Americans."(4) A former member of NEA, John H. Stutesman, 
Jr., also wrote of American naivete in his 1966 Thesis for 
the National War College: 
To paraphrase a Russian proverb, To get to the 
other side it is alright to walk over the bridge 
(2) See Michael Balfour, The Adversaries: AmericaL 
~~ssiaL ~ !he Ope£ Worl£ 1941-62 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1981), pp. 79-80; and Thomas G. Paterson, "Introduc-
tion: American Critics of the Cold War and Their Alterna-
tives," in Col£ War Critics: Al!er£ati.Yll !£ Am~rican f.£E.~i££ 
~£li£Y i£ !~~ Truman Yea~, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 4. 
(3) See George F. Kennan, American Di£10macy 1900-1950 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 77; Kennan, 
Realities of American Foreig£ Policy, p. 25; Balfour, Th~ 
Ad~ers~£ie;~ pp-:-l'0-,-6G~d Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 
1940, LWH Papers. 
(4) Gaddis, Origins of !he Cold~~£, p. 33. 
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postwar world. The dream of a new world order embodied in 
the United Nations had been the focus of American postwar 
plans. The Soviet Union, however, sought security through 
territory and spheres of influence. Unprepared and unsure, 
the United States saw another monster threatening the deli-
cate balance and reacted accordingly. (6) 
For the second time in less than five years, circum-
stances forced the United States to acknowledge its vulner-
ability. This sense of insecurity was new. Americans had 
always felt insulated from world problems. The United States 
bothered no one, and no one bothered it. Traditionally Great 
Britain had served as the bulwark to any threat .from the 
Continent. The British Empire kept a watch on the balance of 
power, assuring its own safety and that of its friends. 
Great Britain's inability to exert a strong influence created 
a vacuum in the world power structure that the United States 
had to fill in order to prevent what it believed to be the 
threat of Soviet expansion. (7) Ambassador W. Averell Harri-
man wrote from Moscow on September 20, 1944, "If the policy 
(6) See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides£! Crisis: ~Pr!~~ 
of K£~!g£ Relations (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 
1975), p. 107; Kennan, American Di.El~y, p, 85.; Balfour, 
Ihe Adver~E!es, pp. 12-13; Norman A. Graebner, Cold ~~E 
~!£lomacy: American Foreign PolicyL 1945-1960 (Princeton: D. 
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 21.; Kennan, Realities 
of ~~~rican Foreign Policy, pp. 26-27; Halle, ColQ ~~E ~ 
~!~tory, pp. 8, 102; and Gaddis, Origi~ £! th~ ColQ War, pp. 
3, 47-48, 61-62. 
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is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate 
her immediate neighbours, penetration of the next immediate 
neighbour becomes at a certain time equally logical."(8) 
The United States perceived the Soviets as a threat to 
the freedom of their neighbors and to American interests in 
those areas. In the months immediately following the war 
American policy makers had to define concrete American inter-
ests and objectives. Truman had told Stalin at Potsdam that 
America wanted a "free world." This meant a world based on 
American values, values not compatible with the Soviet sys-
tern. The principles born of these values, such as self-
determination and the Open Door, could not be. invoked in 
areas under Soviet influence, and the United States was not 
prepared to militarily challenge the Soviet position. These 
principles, which Henderson believed should be the basis of 
American foreign policy, blocked compromise and thus became a 
hindrance at the postwar bargaining tables. (9) 
While the perceived Soviet threat drove most American 
officials toward a more active role in world affairs regard-
less of how ill-defined, the isolationists called for .Ameri-
(8) Balfour, !h~ Adversaries, p. 11. 
(9) See Paul Y. Hammond, Th~ Col£ ~~E Ye~ Am~Eican 
World, 
Terry 
Cold 
1981), 
Adver-
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FoEeig£ Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Inc., 1969), p. 6; Graebner, Cold ~ar QiEloma£y, p. 9; 
H. Anderson, The ~nit~£ ~te~ Great Britain, and th~ 
War 1944-1947 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
P'P."° l04-5; Berle, Tide~ of Cri~is; p. 25; Balfour, The 
~ries, p. 59; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. -----
can withdrawal from the world scene. Still in Congress were 
Hamilton Fish (Republican - New York) and Louis Ludlow (Demo-
crat - Indiana), among the leading interwar isolationists, 
while the Chicago Tribune and John O'Donnell of the Ne~ !ork 
Daily News attacked American interventionist policy in the 
press. The isolationists believed the "Red Scare" was over-
blown, being used as an excuse for imperialism. Imperialism 
was the deadly sin to isolationists, and the devil was Great 
Britain not the Soviet Union. However, their most promi-
nent spokesman, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of 
Michigan, officially left the isolationist ranks in early 
1945. In a speech before the Senate on January 10, Vanden-
berg expressed his views on America's place in the world. He 
cautioned against the deterioration of national defense but 
also called for a United States-Soviet agreement which would 
provide the Soviet Union with the security it so desired. 
The Senator believed a treaty of this type would eliminate 
the Soviet need for a "circle of buffer states" thus placing 
the United States in a position to demand that all military 
gains be subject to postwar revision under the anticipated 
United Nations. In this way, he believed the United States 
could resolve its differences with the Soviet Union and take 
its place in world affairs. There is no evidence that either 
Roosevelt or Truman seriously considered Vandenberg's sugges-
tion, but this speech placed one of the most influential 
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members of the Senate on the side of internationalism, a fact 
which Truman used to his advantage in 1947. (10) 
It is doubtful that the isolationists would have pre-
vailed even with the influence of Senator Vandenberg, for the 
United States was reacting to the new bully on the block. 
Even staunch isolationists, such as Congressman Ludlow, were 
slowly changing their views. Soviet behavior in Eastern 
Europe was not likely to win many friends in the West. Amer-
icans viewed Stalin's quest for satellite states around the 
Soviet Union's borders as a return to the Marxist-Leninist 
plan of world conquest. George Kennan, Deputy Chief of 
Mission in Moscow and later head of the Policy Planning 
Staff, believed that Soviet foreign policy had its roots in 
communist ideology and history. The seeds of this belief 
were planted in the 1930s while under Loy Henderson's tute-
lage at the embassy in Moscow. (11) In his 1947 Foreign 
~ffairs article entitled "The Source of Soviet Conduct" and 
signed "X," he wrote: 
The political personality of Soviet power as we 
know it today is the product of ideology and cir-
cumstances: ideology inherited by the present 
Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had 
their political origin, and circumstances of the 
(10) See Justus D. Doenecke, No~~£ the ~~if~~ The Ql£ 
Isolationists i£ ~he fold ~~ Er~ (Lewisberg: Bucknell Uni-
versity Press, 1979), pp. 10, 65; and Arthur H. Vandenberg, 
Jr., ed., The Private Paee~ £! ~~£ator y~nd~££~ (Boston: 
Houghton Miffli~-C~mpany, 1952), pp. 131, 135-38, 145. 
(11) see Gaddis, Origins of the fold Wa£, p. 134; and 
Yergin, ~£at~~£ed ~~' p. 26. 
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power which they now have exercised for nearly 
three decades in Russia. (12) 
According to Kennan, this ideology preached the hostility of 
the rest of the world and the duty to destroy these opposing 
political forces wherever they existed. The communist way 
was the only way. Although capitalism was sowing the seeds 
of its own destruction, the Soviets believed they could 
quicken the process, although there was no need for haste. 
Since the outcome was inevitable, the Communists could afford 
to take their time. Kennan saw this unresolvable conflict 
between communism and capitalism as the major obstacle to 
Soviet-American relations. Their distrust of all other 
nations made it impossible for the Soviets to deal honestly, 
openly, and in good faith. (13) 
Henderson shared Kennan's view that it was impossible to 
negotiate in good faith with the Soviet Union. Henderson's 
experience in the Baltic States and the Soviet Union taught 
him to be skeptical in dealing with the Soviets. In studying 
Soviet agreements, he found that the Kremlin usually failed 
to keep its promises. Henderson did not believe that the 
Soviet Union had abandoned what he termed "its basic aggres-
sive objectives."(14) 
(12) George F. 
FoE~ig£ Affairs 25 
Kennan, "The Sources 
(July 1947): 566. 
(13) Ibid., pp. 570-75. 
of Soviet Conduct," 
(14) See Kuniholm, fold ~2-.E in NeaE ~~~, p. 134; and 
Yergin, ~~~tt~Eed Pe~£~, p. 26. 
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Others, however, disagreed with Kennan's assessment. 
American columnist Walter Lippmann believed that Stalin was 
merely continuing a czarist line rather than a new communist 
line. Like the Russian regimes of old, the Soviet regime 
sought security in a limited European domain, not world con-
quest. ( 15) Louis Halie later wrote, "The behaviour of Russia 
under the Communists has been Russian behaviour rather than 
Communist behaviour."(16) According to Halle, fear rather 
than ambition drove the Russians to expansion. Russia's 
policies were defensive, therefore, not aggressive. (17) 
Regardless of the reason~ for expansion, whether ideological 
or practical, the Soviet Union was extending its influence. 
The result of either motivation was extremely disturbing to 
the United States. 
Heated rhetoric on both sides worsened the situation. 
In a February 9, 1946 election speech, Stalin took all the 
credit for the defeat of the Germans, stating that the vie-
tory proved the superiority of the Soviet social system. The 
West viewed this rare radio address as evidence of the Pre-
mier's true feelings about Soviet-Western relations. Ken-
(15) Walter Lippmann, !h~ Col£ Wa£!. ~ ~~£y.in .!!...:..~~ 
Fo.E_~ign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947), cited in Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The Dynamics of World Power: ~Doc~ 
mentary ~ist,£E.y £! gni~ed States ~ign Policy 1945-1971, 
vol. 2: Eastern Euro~ and~ Soviet Union, ed. by Walter 
LaFeber (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), p.xix. 
(16) Halle, Col£ War as History, p. 11. 
(17) Ibid., pp. 12, 17. 
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nan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow on February 22 affirmed 
this view. Writing a year and a half before his "Mr. X" 
article, Kennan examined Soviet thought and behavior in an 
attempt to forecast future Soviet activity and to guide 
American policy. (18) He wrote that Soviet power was: 
Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly 
sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it 
can easily withdraw - and usually does - when 
strong resistance is encountered at any point. (19) 
Wiriston Churchill expressed this sentiment publicly in a 
speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 
~- In what has become known as the "Iron Curtain Speech," 
the British Prime Minister described the split that existed 
in world affairs. He called for the Western democracies to 
put forth a united front based on military strength in order 
to insure their security. The response from Moscow was 
heated as Stalin compared Churchill's views to those of 
Hitler's on racial superiority. Still not ready to acknowl-
(18) See Embassy of .the USSR, ~~ech Delivered £y i!..=.. Y..:_ 
Stalin at Meeting: of Voters of !:_he Stalin Electo.E_al Area of 
~os~ (Washington, 1946), reprinted in Schlesinger, ~Y~ics 
of Worl£ Po~, 2:191-93; Herbert Feis, Trust to Terror: !~~ 
££1£ WaE.L 1945-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1970), p. 75; and George Kennan to James Byrnes, February 22, 
1946, United States Department of State, Korei~ ~~lati£ns of 
! he !! n i ! e d St at e s L ll-1.i ( W a shin gt on , 1 9 6 9 ) , VI , .6 9 6 - 7 0 9 . 
(19) Kennan to Byrnes, February 22, 1946, KRU~L ll..1.i1 
VI, 707. 
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edge publicly a get tough policy, the White House disasso-
ciated itself from Churchill's views. (20) 
By fall the White House Staff added its own voice to the 
cry for action against communist expansion. In a S~ptember 
1946 summary of Soviet-American relations, Special Counsel to 
the President Clark M. Clifford stated that the only way for 
the United States to insure its future security was to halt 
further Soviet aggression. He called for a vigorous resis-
tance to Soviet expansion into certain strategic areas. Not 
only should the United States prepare itself militarily, said 
Clifford, but it should give assistance to any democratic 
nation threatened by the Soviet Union in the form of economic 
aid and political support. Clifford also felt that it was 
'important to win public support for American policies by 
educating the people on the aims of Soviet policy. (21) 
Supporting Henderson's views on the significance of the 
Near East to United States interests, Clifford called for 
(20) See Churchill speech in U.S. Congress, Senate, 79th 
Cong., 2nd sess. 5 March 1946, Co~~~~sional Record A1145-
1147, reprinted in Schlesinger, Qy~mi£~ of World Power, 2: 
210-17; see Stalin's remarks in !h~ ~ew !Ork Time~, 14 March 
1946, p. 4, reprinted in Schlesinger, Qy~~~ics £! ~orld 
Po~~' 2: 217-221; and Feis, !rust to Terror, p. _78. 
(21) Clark Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet 
Union: Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the 
President, -September 24, 1946," in Arthur Krock, Memo_!rs: 
~i~~ !ear~.£!! the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 
1968), pp. 419, 477-79, 482. 
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specific resistance to Soviet expansion in the area. The 
State Department's evaluation of the importance of this part 
of the world emphasized the need for a definite American 
policy even though it had long been a special British pre-
serve. Henderson and NEA experts believed that the vast oil 
resources of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula as well 
as the strategic location of the Northern Tier states 
(Greece, Turkey, and Iran) were crucial to American security. 
Russian interest in the area dated back centuries, and the 
State Department was concerned about Soviet activities in the 
Northern Tier. If the Soviet Union established a foothold in 
the area, it could not only shut off Near Eastern oi~ to the 
West, but the Soviets could also control the Eastern Mediter-
ranean and South Asia. (22) 
Oil and strategic needs were not the only ties between 
the United States and the Near East. The cultural and reli-
gious bonds were also tight, especially with Palestine. The 
Arab-Jewish conflict heat~d up as Jewish refugees sought 
admission to Palestine at the end of the war. This issue 
caused a split between Henderson's office and the Truman 
Administration and between the Administration and Great 
(22) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21, 
1946, United States Department of State, Forei.s!!! Relations of 
!~~United St~!~ 11ii {Washington, 1969), VII, 241-42. 
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 46-47; Berle, Tides of Crisis, p. 
156; and Ande~s;~ ~~ited ~!~!~~Great ~~i~~ p. 122. 
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Britain, the mandatory authority in Palestine. (23) Not only 
was this a break in the unity which Churchill urged between 
America and Britain, but it created the type of unstable 
situation in the Arab world on which the Soviet policy of 
expansion seemed to thrive. 
Soviet actions concerning ~ Iran, Turkey, and Greece in 
1946-1947 indicated to American oflicials that the Soviet 
Union was not content with ·its Eastern European buffer. It 
was in response to these issues that the Truman Administra-
tion embarked on a policy of standing firm in the face of 
Soviet pressure. Kennan had advocated this policy in the 
Long Telegram, and it was given public airing in his Korei~ 
Affairs article. Secretary of State Byrnes called this pol-
icy "patience with firmness," but it was in Kennan's article 
that the strategy was first given the name "containment."(24) 
Kennan stated: 
Soviet pressure against the free institutions 
of the Western world is something that can be 
contained by the adroit and vigilant application of 
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting 
geographical and political points, corresponding to 
the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. . (25) 
American foreign policy finally took shape in Kennan's con-
tainment concept. European recovery programs such as the 
(23) See Berle, Tides of frisis, pp. 155, 169-70; and 
Anderson, United States, Grea~ Britain, p. 152. 
(24) See Graebner, Col£ War Diploma.£.Y, pp. 22, 39; 
Balfour, !he ~dv~~i~~, p. 68; Halle, Cold War ~~ Histo£y, 
p. 107; and Gaddis, Origins of the Co!£~~£, p. 284. 
(25) Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," p. 576. 
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Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were attempts by the 
United States not only to bolster sagging economies but to 
show that free enterprise and democracy were a better alter-
native than Soviet communism. Henderson constantly urged the 
use of economic assistance to achieve security goals, a 
policy which enabled the United States to avoid the criti-
cisms which would have come with a direct military 
response. ( 2 6) 
This policy also had its critics. Even before the 
Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Union had opposed what it 
believed to be American expansion into areas which bordered 
it or its satellites. The Soviets felt threatened by Ameri-
can attempts to exert influence in Iran and Turkey. Sec re-
tary of Commerce Henry Wallace pointed out that the Soviet 
position among her neighbors was similar to the relation 
between the United States and Latin America. It was thus up 
to the United States to seek understanding and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. The Secretary's public criticism of 
(26) See Balfour, The Adversaries, p. 82; and William 
Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Conblenz, Unite£ 
~ate~ Forei9:£ Policy 1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1956), p. 116. See Chapter III herein for 
Henderson's views on the use of economic assistance and his 
contribution to the Truman Doctrine. 
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administration policy in a speech on September 12, 1946, led 
Truman to ask for his resignation. (27) Walter Lippmann also 
spoke out against confrontation as the only answer. Lippmann 
doubted that true cooperation was possible, but he suggested 
that "an accommodation, a modus vivendi" was preferable. (28) 
Loy Henderson rejected both accommodation and coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union. He stated in 1962: 
. we have uniformly discovered that our flexi-
bility and willingness to accommodate have tended 
only to st~engthen the prestige and international 
position of the Soviet Union and to weaken our 
own. (29) 
Henderson did not reach this conclusion hastily, as he was 
well-informed in Communist ideology and tactics. Among his 
personal papers is a worn copy of the Theses and Statutes on 
the ~~ir£ (Communist) International adopted in 1920. As 
Henderson saw it, the Cold War was the struggle between the 
free world led by the United States and the Communist aggres-
sor led by the Soviet Union. (30) Gaddis wrote, "American 
(27) See Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confronta-
ii.2.E....!. Postwar reconstruction and th~ Origins .£!. the Cold War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 190; 
Kuniholm, fold ~ar in Near Ea~i, pp. 365-67; and see for 
Wallace's speech ~ital ~~£he~.£!. ihe !?.2_y XII (1 October 
1946): 738-41, reprinted in Schlesinger, !?_y~ami~ £! ~£El£ 
fow~, 2:255-260. 
(28) Benton J. Bernstein, "Walter Lippmann and the Early 
Cold War," in Paterson, fol£ WaE Critic~, p. 30. 
(29) Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. 
(30) See printed material, Communism File, Container 6, 
LWH Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. 
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leaders did not want a Cold War, but they wanted insecurity 
even less."(31) The struggle for security and American 
interests in the Near East dominated Henderson's policy con-
siderations during his tenure as Director of NEA. 
(31) Gaddis, Orig_!ns of the Cold War, p. 353. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HERO: 
HENDERSON AND ORIGINS OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
When Loy Henderson took the position of Director of the 
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in April 1945, he 
brought with him twenty-five years of experience, but only 
two of these years had been spent in Near Eastern affairs. 
Fortun~tely, the Director was able to rely on an experienced 
staff. Knowing he was not an expert on the area, he listened 
to those on his staff who had the expertise which he lacked. 
The Near East was not the focus of world attention in early 
1945. The devastation in Western Europe and the fate of 
Germany and Eastern Europe domina~ed the postwar scene. Hen-
derson, however, realized the importance of the Near East to 
peace and security, and he was determined to keep the Near 
East free of Soviet dominance. (1) 
As he did with all diplomatic questions, Loy Henderson 
looked at the situation in the Near East in light of American 
interests and the American policy of maintaining world peace. 
He tried persistently to persuade the administration that the 
.Near East was as important to the United States as Eastern 
Europe. Henderson pointed to the strategic value of the Near 
(1) Kuniholm, Cold War in Near Eas~, pp. 240-43. 
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East as the highway which linked three continents and to the 
natural resources of the area, most especially oil. In addi-
tion the Director of NEA noted the weakening of Near Eastern-
Western European ties as well as growing discontent among 
dissatisfied citizens. These factors along with the ravages 
of the war caused great instability in the area and opened 
the door for the spread of international communism or more 
specifically, Soviet aggression. Henderson viewed the situa-
tion in the Near East as a threat to world peace and called 
on the United States and the other powers to reach an agree-
ment on the area. He realized, however, that the likelihood 
of achieving an understanding was slim due to the conflicting 
interests each power had in the region. (2) 
The end of World War II brought these conflicting inter-
ests sharply into focus. The world was divided into spheres 
of influence, and Eastern Europe was solidly in the Soviet 
camp. Henderson and NEA were concerned with this division of 
the world into opposing sides, but they believed that Soviet 
aggression made it inevitable. It was thus necessary for the 
United States to insure its own position. NEA emphasized the 
strategic importance to American security of Greece and 
(2) See Loy W. Henderson, "American Political and Stra-
tegic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe," 
!~~ ~~E~~~~nt of~~~~~ Bulletin, 23 November 1947, pp. 996-
99; and Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, James Dunn, and John 
Hickerson, undated, FRUSL 11.!.§., VII, 4-6. 
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Turkey, the only two countries which blocked the Soviet 
Union's total control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Hen-
derson and Near Eastern experts believed that it was contrary 
to United States interests for this strategic and petroleum 
laden area to fall under Soviet domination. (3) 
In a report prepared by the Coordinating Committee of 
the Department of State, entitled "American Economic Policy 
in the Middle East," Henderson and the other committee mem-
bers called for an active Near Eastern economic policy. The 
extension of credit and removal of trade restrictions along 
with technical assistance would aid the United States in 
achieving its political objectives in the area. These objec-
tives included peace, security, stability, and the assurance 
of political freedom to choose their own way of life. 
Raising the standard of living in these countries would 
eliminate economic discontent and reduce the attraction of 
the Soviet Union. It was also important for the United 
States to ease Near Eastern fears of Western imperialism. 
Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Div~sion of NEA, 
wrote in a draft memorandum to President Truman that it was 
imperative for the United States not to make the same mis-
takes as Great Britain. American policy should emphasize 
(3) Henderson to Acheson, October 21, 1946, K~Q~ l~ii' 
VII, 241-42. 
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the development of the native peoples, not the economic 
interest of the United States. (4) 
Henderson agreed that loans for construction and devel-
opment were the best way to boost American prestige. The 
Director of NEA viewed the extension of credits to deserving 
nations as an "important diplomatic weapon." He felt that 
the financial commitment was justified since the region was 
rapidly becoming a major political issue. Even though Hen-
derson realized that economic aid alone would not be enough 
to win the political struggle in the Near East, he believed 
it could yield certai? diplomatic gains. (5) 
Henderson's battle to gain administration support for a 
more active American role in the Northern Tier proved diffi-
cult, as administration officials viewed the area as part of 
the British sphere and thus advocated that the United States 
stay out of the affairs of these countries. In addition many 
within the government still looked on Germany as the enemy 
and the Soviet Union as the ally. Henderson, however, con-
tinued to press for a stronger American presence in the Near 
East. In Merriam's memorandum prepared for the President, 
NEA stressed the need to restore Near Eastern stability. It 
(4) See "American Economic Policy in the Middle East," 
May 2, 1945, United States Department of State, Forei~~ 
~~lati£!!.!!. of!£~ United ~ta!~L .!.2.~ (Washington, 1969), 
VIII, 34-38; and Gordon Merriam to Prasident Truman (draft), 
August 1945, FRUS, .!.2.i1' VIII, 46-48. 
(5) Henderson to Acheson, Dunn, and Hickerson, undated, 
~~USL 194i, VII, 8-9. 
stated that British and French failure to raise the people 
from poverty and disease provided the Soviets an opportunity 
to take advantage of the situation. It particularly empha-
sized the perils to Western interests of Soviet designs on 
Turkey and the continued presence of World War II Soviet 
occupation forces in Iran. (6) 
In late 1945 Truman agreed that the Near East deserved a 
more prominent position in foreign policy considerations. 
Accordingly, policy formulation for the Northern Tier passed 
to the capable control of Dean Acheson and Loy Henderson. 
These State Department veterans shared the view that since 
the region was vital to the United States, the administration 
should stand firm against the Soviet Union. This view pre-
vailed when the Northern Tier became a main target of Soviet 
activity in 1945-1946. Acheson and Henderson skillfully 
guided the formulation of a definite Near Eastern policy. (7) 
Iran was the first Northern Tier country to feel the 
pressure of Soviet-American antagonism. Called "a classic 
case of competition for spheres of influence," the Iran 
crisis of 1945-1946 centered on four questions: the removal 
o~ foreign troops from Iran, oil concessions, the political 
(6) See Kuniholm, Cold~~ in ~~~~as~, pp. 242-44, 
397-98; and Merriam to Truman draft, August 1945, fRUS, l1i~' 
VIII, 45-46. 
(7) Kuniholm, Cold War in Near Ea~~' pp. 242-44. 
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influence of the United States and Great Britain in Tehran, 
and Soviet activity in the northern province of Azerbai-
jan. (8) 
The issue of oil concessions caused tension as early as 
September 1944. Realizing that the United States and Great 
Britain were nearing agreement with the Iranian government 
for oil concessions in the country's southeast, the Soviet 
Union demanded exclusive rights to the oil and mineral depos-
its in the north. The Iranian government's alarm at the 
Soviet demand moved the parliament to terminate all negotia-
tions for oil concessions to foreign governments. (9) 
Their demands thwarted, the Soviets proceeded to fuel 
growing discontent in Azerbaijan and among the Kurds. The 
USSR supported the Kurd independence movement, and Soviet 
troops in northern Iran refused to intervene while restrict-
ing Iranian troop movement into the Soviet zone. Fearful of 
losing the north, Iran expressed concern to the State Depart-
ment, but the United States chose not to interfere, suggest-
ing that Iran and the Soviet Union negotiate their differ-
ences. Believing that their internal turmoil was due to the 
presence of foreign troops, the Iranians requested the early 
withdrawal of Soviet, British, and American forces. In June 
1945 the United States and Great Britain obligingly agreed to 
(8) Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 177-78. 
(9) Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 50-53. 
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begin partial withdrawal of troops eight months before the 
March 2, 1946 date established by the 1942 Tripartite Treaty 
of Alliance between Iran, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union. (10) 
The Soviets were not so accommodating, and Loy Henderson 
became increasingly concerned about the Iranian situation. 
In an August 1945 memorandum to Secretary of State Byrnes, he 
identified the two main problems: the traditional rivalry 
between Great Britain and the USSR for supremacy and the 
growing instability of Iranian internal affairs. The prob-
!ems of the Iranian government reached the crisis point in 
Azerbaijan. Strapped in poverty and neglected by Tehran, the 
province's communist-led Tudeh Party called for autonomy and 
in September formed the National G-0vernment of Azerbaijan. 
With apparent Soviet backing, the nationalists revolted 
against the central government in November 1945. Soviet 
troops prevented the Iranian army from entering the province 
to the suppress the rebellion. (11) United States Ambassador 
Wallace Murray reported to the Secretary of State, "There .is 
no question but that Russians are interfering with all 
defense measures taken by Iranians in north and it 
(10) See correspondence between American Embassy in Iran 
and the State Department, February through June 1945, tRUSL 
!1.12 1 VIII, 362-380. 
(11) See Loy Henderson to James Byrnes, August 23, 1945, 
FR~~L !.2_i~, VIII, 398; Feis, Trust to Terror, pp. 63, 66; and 
Jones, Fifte~~ Weeks, pp. 50-53. 
seems reasonable supposition that they are actually directing 
planned military campaign."(12) 
Iran formally complained about Soviet actions to the 
United Nations in January 1946. Resolving that both sides 
were willing to negotiate a settlement, the Security Council 
suggested that Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam visit Moscow to 
negotiate with Stalin and Molotov. According to the Iranian 
Foreign Office, the main Soviet aims in Iran were oil conces-
sions in the north, internal as well as international trans-
port rights, and a special position at the Caspian Sea port 
of Pahla~i, which had been controlled by Russia prior to 
1921. In addition Stalin told Qavam that Tehran must recog-
nize Azerbaijan's autonomy. These conditions were unaccept-
able to Iran as it feared these concessions would lead to 
loss of sovereignty. Qavam thus brought the matter before 
the Security Council again in late March. (13) 
In the meantime, the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Iran passed. Great Britain and the 
United States, adhering to the 1942 treaty, evacuated their 
remaining troops. The Soviet Union refused to comply with the 
treaty until they received a satisfactory agreement on oil 
concessions. Reports that Soviet troops were moving south 
(12) Ambassador Wallace Murray 
November 28, 1945, ~RUSL 11.111 VIII, 
(Lran) 
464. 
to James Byrnes, 
(13) See Jones, Fifteen ~~~ks, pp. 50-53; Ambassador 
Murray to Byrnes, November 26, 1945, FRUSL 1945, VIII, 456; 
and Feis, ~~ ~£ TeEE£E• pp. 69-70, 81. 
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toward Tehran and Turkey further aggravated the situation. 
The Soviets defended their presence on the grounds that the 
hostility of the Iranian government threatened Soviet oil 
fields in Baku and that the 1921 treaty gave them the right 
to intervene in Iran's internal affairs if conditions warran-
ted. The United States called these claims absurd since the 
1921 treaty only permitted intervention if there was a threat 
from a third power. (14) 
While the Security Council considered the Iranian com-
plaint, negotiations continued in Tehran between the Soviet 
ambassador and Qavam. They announced an accord on April 5, 
1946 that provided for Soviet troop withdrawal and the forma-
tion of a Soviet-Iranian oil company. The Soviet agreement 
that Azerbaijan was an Iranian internal problem further dif-
fused the Russo-Iranian crisis. Conclusion of the accord 
with the Soviets prompted the Iranian government to withdraw 
its complaint to the Security Council on April 15. (15) 
The crisis in Iran appeared to be over. "However," 
wrote Dean Acheson, "in ~he Near East things 're not always_ 
what they seem."(16) By October 1946 the Iranian government 
(14) See Jones, Fifteen ~eeks, pp. 48-49; Paterson, 
Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 179-80; Ambassador Harri-
man (Soviet Union) to Dean Acheson, December 23, 1945, K~g~L 
lli1, VIII, 510; and Ambassador Murray to James Byrnes, 
December 28, 1945, FRUSL 1945, VIII, 517. 
(15) See Feis, Trust to Te££Or, p. 85; Jones, Fi!te~~ 
~~~~~' pp. 48-49; and Paterson, Soviet-American Co~front~= 
~io~, pp. 179-80. 
(16) Acheson, ~~sent at ~he Creati~~' p. 197. 
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became nervous again and sought assistance from the United 
States. The Iranian ambassador informed Loy Henderson that 
his government was at a crossroads and felt pressure to 
follow the Soviet line despite popular opposition to this 
course. Henderson recommended to Acheson that the United 
;,i 
States offer Iran economic and political aid to protect her 
sovereignty. In keeping with his earlier proposals, the 
Director of NEA suggested this assistance include development 
loans and combat supplies for internal security. (17) A memo-
randum prepared on October 18, 1946 by Henderson and his 
staff for Secretary of State Byrnes stated NEA's view of the 
importance of Iran: 
In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere 
bilateral relations between Iran and the United 
States. Politically, it involves our policy of 
supporting the independence of small countries in 
the spirit of the United.Nations. Strategically, 
it involves the defense of our military interests 
in the entire Near and Middle Eastern area. 
Both the political and strategic aspects of this 
problem are an integral part of the broader ques-
tion of United States relations with the Soviet 
Union. (18) 
Armed with the assurance of United States economic and 
combat aid, the Iranian army moved against the rebels in 
Azerbaijan in November 1946. Believing it had obtained the 
desired oil concessions, the Soviet Union had withdrawn its 
(17) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 8, 1946, 
FRQ~ 1946, VII, 523-24; and Feis, !rust !£ Ter.E.£.E, p. 86. 
(18) "Implementation of United States Policy Toward 
Iran," prepared by NEA, October 18, 1946, FRUS.L 1946, VII, 
535. 
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troops. The rebels were on their own, and the northern 
province once again returned to the rule of Tehran. The 
Iranian government and American Ambassador George Allen 
agreed that the swift victory in Azerbaijan resulted from the 
recognition of all concerned that Iranian sovereignty enjoyed 
United States support. (19) 
American influence was apparent again in October 1947 
when Ambassador Allen persuaded the Iranian parliament to 
reject the oil concession agreement with the Soviet Union, 
leaving the Soviets with neither the coveted oil nor the 
northern province. The outcome of events in Iran gave ere-
dence to the belief that a strong American position could 
contain Soviet expansion. Supporters of the theory of con-
tainment and the Truman Doctrine later pointed to the success 
in Iran when opponents questioned their views. (20) 
Not all factions of the American government supported 
the American position in Iran. Isolationists did not see the 
need to confront the Soviet Union over this affair. They did 
not believe that the USSR posed a direct threat to the United 
States, and they distrusted British "aggression" more than 
Soviet. New York Republican Representative Hamilton Fish 
asserted that Soviet claims in Iran were as valid as those of 
the British. American protests of Soviet aggression while 
(19) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 
181; and Acheson, Present at ~Creation, p. 198. 
(20) Paterson, ~£Vi~-A~£~~ Confrontation, pp. 182-
8 3 . 
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accepting British colonialism brought charges by the ~~!cago 
Tribune that the United States was living by a double stan-
dard. (21) 
The United States had gained confidence in get-tough 
measures, however, and from 1945 to 1947 the Truman Adminis-
tration followed the advice of Henderson and Acheson and 
stood in firm opposition to Soviet aims in Turkey. While 
Iranian sovereignty was needed to insure the continued flow 
of Persian Gulf oil, Turkish sovereignty was of even greater 
value to United States security. Situated between the Bal-
kans and the Middle East and between the Mediterranean ·and 
Black Seas, Turkey's strategic importance was second to none. 
This firmly anti-Soviet country provided a barrier to Soviet 
expansion and could serve as a base for major military opera-
tions if armed conflict occurred. Turkey's apparent politi-
cal and economic stability, a rarity in this area of growing 
unrest, further enhanced its importance. The Departments of 
State, War, and Navy believed that the loss of Turkey to the 
Soviet Union would lead ultimately to Soviet control in 
Greece and the Near and Middle East. Such a shift in the 
(21) Doenecke, Not to the Swift, p. 63. 
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balance of power toward the USSR was unacceptable. (22) A 
1946 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated: 
. the faith and political reliance in the major 
non-Soviet powers of the Middle Eastern peoples and 
nations on the periphery of the "iron curtain" is a 
considerable although intangible factor in U.S. 
security. This faith and reliance will be gravely 
affected if not dissipated by success of the 
Soviets in their present political venture in the 
direction of the Turkish Straits. (23) 
The Soviets had raised the issue of control of the 
Dardanelles even before World War II ended. The 1936 Mon-
treux C~nvention, the most recent Strait's agreement, which 
gave Turkey exclusive control of the Straits in time of war 
as well as the right to fortify them, placed the Soviet Union 
in a precarious position during the war. Turkey, as a non-
belligerent, allowed the Germans access to the Straits, and 
Stalin rightly felt threatened. The United States and Great 
Britain agreed that revisions to the Montreux Convention were 
justifiable, but Soviet demands were too high. Not only did 
they want the Straits under joint control of the Black Sea 
powers (USSR and Turkey), but they also sought boundary 
changes through the annexation of the former Russian dis-
(22) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 
182-83; Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, !he Unit~£ 
g~~~ ~!!.£ Tur~~y and ~ (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951), pp. 144-45; and Geoffrey Warner, "Truman Doc-
trine and the Marshall Plan," International ~!!air~ 
50:1(1974): 86-87. 
(23) Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of War Patterson 
and Secretary of Navy Forrestal, August 23, 1946, fRUS, l1ii' 
VII, 858. 
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tricts of Kars and Ardahan and the establishment of a base in 
Turkey. The Turks, firmly opposed to Soviet interference, 
reacted to the demands by strengthening their army. (24) 
On August 24, 1945, the Turkish ambassador expressed to 
Henderson his concern about apparent American disinterest in 
the Soviet demands, but the State Department's proposals of 
September 3 for modification of the Montreux Convention did 
not ease Turkish fears. (25) Turkey was concerned with the 
build up of Soviet troops in the Balkans, especially in Rum-
ania and Bulgaria, but the United States believed the action 
was merely part of the Soviet war of nerves and advised the 
Turks to remain calm. In late October 1945 the United States 
sent its proposals on the modification of the Montreux Con-
vention to Ankara. The Turkish government accepted the pro-
posals in principle, but it felt the point calling for free 
passage of warships of all Black Sea powe~s posed a definite 
security threat since it was the only non-Soviet satellite on 
the Black Sea. The Turkish government feared that the Black 
Sea would become a Sovie~ naval base. The Soviets, however; 
rejected the proposals, claiming they did not provide ade-
(24) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 
190-91; Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 179; Ambassador Harriman to 
Edward Stettinius, March 21, 1945, fRU~ 1945, VIII, 1220; 
Ambassador Steinhardt (Turkey) to Stettinius, March 22 and 
31, 1945, fRUS, 1945, VIII, 1224, 1230; and Ambassador Winant 
(United Kingdom) to Stettinius, June 14, 1945; FRUSL 1945, 
VIII, 1235. 
(25) For details of American proposals see Byrnes to 
President Truman, September 3, 1945, fRU~ !945, VIII, 1242-
45. 
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quate security for the USSR, and they continued to favor a 
bilateral agreement with Turkey. (26) 
In the early months of 1946, Soviet rhetoric and propa-
ganda combined with the situation in Iran to heighten tension 
in Ankara. The rumor of Soviet troop movement from Iran to 
Turkey resulted in the United States sending a small force, 
headed by the u.s.s. Missouri, to Istanbul in March. Ignor-
ing this display of "toughness," the Soviet Union continued 
to pressure the .Turkish government. On August 7, 1946 Dean 
Acheson learned of additional Soviet demands. Although mak-
ing concession to the American call for universal commercial 
access to the Straits, the Soviets advocated a joint defense 
of the Dardanelles with Turkey. Acheson and the State 
Department concluded that such an arrangement would result in 
Soviet occupation of Turkey. (27) John L. Gaddis wrote of 
this conclusion, "The real problem was that American leaders, 
by the summer of 1946, simply were no longer willing to trust 
the Russians."(28) President Truman expressed this distrust 
(26) See Ambassador Wilson (Turkey) to Byrnes, October 
27 and November 12, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1260-61, 1275; 
Byrnes to Wilson, October 30, 1945, FR~ 1945, VIII, 1266; 
British Embassy to State Department, August 28 arid November 
5. 1945, [RUS, .!.2_.12,, VIII, 1241-42, 1273; Winant to Byrnes, 
November 16, 1945, FR~ 1945, VIII, 1279-80; memorandum of 
conversation between Turkish Ambassador and Henderson, August 
24, 1945, FRus, .!.2_.12,, virI, 1240. 
(27) See Feis, !rust to Ter_!£E, p. 181; Soviet Charge' 
Orekhov to Dean Acheson, August 7, 1946, FRUSL !2!.~.r VII, 
829; and Acheson, Present ~~.~Creation, p. 195. 
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in his memoirs: 
We had learned from the experience of the past two 
years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant 
Soviet occupation and control. To allow Russia to 
set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops 
into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the 
straits, would, in the natural course of events, 
result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East 
falling under Soviet control. (29) 
Loy Henderson suggested to Acheson that the United States 
government issue a warning to the Soviets and prepare to 
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support Turkey militarily if the Soviets attacked. On August 
15, Henderson and Acheson visited the White House where they 
made the recommendation to President Truman. (30) The depart-
ments of State, War, and Navy, along with the Chiefs of 
Staff, recommended to the President that the United States 
stand firm in its call for international control and Turkish 
defense of the Straits. After Truman's concurrence, washing-
ton informed Moscow on August 19 .. Once more a stand-firm 
policy proved effective. (31) 
Loy Henderson and the staff of the Off ice of Near East-
ern and African Affairs had the responsibility of forming a 
detailed Turkish-American policy. Even though Turkey was the 
strongest, most stable country of the area, Henderson real-
(29) Harry S. Truman, Memoir~, vol. 
and HOE~ (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
2; :f~~ .9_f Trial:; 
1956), p. 97. 
(30) A draft of the proceedings in the President's 
office can be found in the Turkey File, Container 13, LWH 
Papers. Truman is referred to as "Mr. Smith." 
(31) See Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 181; and Jones, 
~i!~~~£ We~~~' pp. 62-63. 
ized that Turkey alone was no match for the Soviet Union. 
NEA recommended diplomatic, moral, economic, and military 
support for Turkey, even calling for the United States to 
supply military equipment, either through Great Britain or 
directly, if the British were unable to do so. (32) 
Greece, the third country of the Northern Tier, pre- . 
sented the United States with a more complex policy problem. 
It had been invaded by both the Italians and the Germans 
during World War II. At the conclusion of four merciless 
years of occupation, Greece was in political and economic 
ruins. The withdrawal of the Germans, though, did not bring 
an end to the strife. By December 1944 a civil war raged 
between the leftwing resistance fighters and the British-
supported rightwing government. Retreating to the hill 
regions, the rebels, calling themselves the National Libera-
tion Front (EAM), carried on a guerrilla war with the aid and 
protection of the communist regimes of Albania, Yugoslavia, 
and Bulgaria. (33) 
The antagonism between Greece and these three nations 
was not merely the result of the normal capitalist-communist 
distrust. As a result of long-standing disputes· in these 
(32) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21, 1946, 
with memorandum prepared by John D. Jernigan, E:..!3:~ .!_1i_§., 
VII, 893-97. 
(33) See Paterson, Soviet=~~Eic~ f£~frontation, p. 
183; and Feis, !ru~! !£ TerE£E1 p. 175. 
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recently formed nations, Greece coveted territory in all, and 
all coveted territory in Greece. Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugo-
slavia claimed the Macedonian region, while the Epirus region 
was the bone of contention between Greece and Albania. Each 
side accused the other of atrocities and border violations. 
The United States did not support Greek territorial claims, 
feeling that Greece could obtain nothing strategically or 
politically important in these areas. A Greek victory 
these disputes, however, would probably invite Soviet inter-
vention on behalf of her communist brothers. (34) 
Greek internal affairs were in a state of chaos even 
without these border disputes. The government was f lound-
ering, the British were desperately trying to maintain their 
influence, and the economy was in ruins. It was not sur-
prising, therefore, that the Greek government sought f inan-
cial assistance from the United States. The United States 
could not support the EAM because of its sizeable communist 
element, yet the repressive government was in complete oppo-
sition to American democratic principles. Henderson believed 
that the Greek crisis was a threat to world peace and a 
potential threat to United States security. As the only non-
communist Balkan country, Greece was critical to the United 
States position in the area. Henderson and NEA urged inter-
(34) See "Greek territorial claims and other problems in 
relations between Greece and neighboring countries of inter-
est to the United States," September 1944 - December 1945, 
FRQ.§..i_ l1i~' VIII, 300-58. 
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nal reforms in Greece as a prerequisite to American assist-
ance, and the Director warned the Greek embassy that govern-
ment moderation was imperative to maintain United States sup-
port.(35) 
Increased guerrilla activity, caused by the return of 
King George II in the fall of 1946, brought renewed pleas for 
United States assistance. The inefficient Greek government 
was unable to decide how to spend a twenty-five million 
dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank in January 1946; 
therefore, the State Department was reluctant to discuss 
further aid. The belief that Greece was the object of Soviet 
aggression, however, persuaded Byrnes and Acheson to listen 
to the request of the Greek economic mission. Once more the 
administration pointed to reform as the condition for 
increased assistance. (36) 
The threats along the border combined with food short-
ages and rampant inflation to crea~e a perilously u~stable 
situation by late 1946. The United States, therefore, sent 
an economic mission to Greece in January 1947, led by Paul A. 
Porter, to evaluate the state of affairs. The mission 
(35) See Greek Ambassador Diamantopoulos to President 
Taylor of the Export-Import Bank, August 20, 1945, FR~ 
1945, VIII, 234; Paterson, Soviet-American Con!E.£.!!~ati££, p. 
185; and memo~andum of conversation between Greek Charge 
Gouras and Loy Henderson, September 5, 1946, FRUSL 194i, VII, 
200. 
(36) See Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 177; Ache.son, 
~EeSe£~ at ~he fEeati.£!!, p. 198; and Paterson, Soviet=~~eri= 
£~£ f££!Eontati.£!!, p. 187. 
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reported that Greece immediately needed extensive United 
States economic and military assistance and that an American 
mission rather than the Greek government should administer 
this aid in Greece. (37) 
In constant communication with the American Embassy in 
Athens, Loy Henderson realized that the Greek crisis was 
becoming more acute even prior to the report of the Porter 
mission. In October 1946 Henderson proposed to Byrnes and 
Acheson a United States policy for Greece. After summarizing 
Greece's internal and border problems and the importance of 
Greece to the United States, the Director of NEA urged a 
policy of political and economic assistance before civil war 
erupted. He suggested that military aid might be necessary 
if the British were unable to continue to provide the equip-
ment necessary for the Greek government to maintain internal 
order and territorial integrity. (38) 
The State Department feared that an economically 
depressed Great Britain w9uld be unable to meet its obliga-
tions in Greece. Greece had been under British protection 
since it won its independence in 1829 and for more than a 
century stood along with the other Northern Tier countries as 
a barrier to Russian designs in the Near and Middle East. 
Although American and British interests were similar in the 
(37) Jones, fif!~ Weeks, pp. 74-76. 
(38) Loy Henderson to James Byrnes and Dean Acheson, 
October 21, 1946, I~~ 12.i~, VII, 240-44. 
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Northern Tier, the State Department believed the area was a 
British responsibility. Under Henderson's direction, NEA 
followed a policy of working in alliance with the British 
against the Soviet Union. (39} 
The United States viewed the presence of British troops 
in Greece and the British support of the Greek government as 
the only elements of stability in the otherwise chaotic Greek 
situation. Great Britain, however, was on the brink of 
financial disaster. The biting winter of 1947 brought such 
severe fuel shortages that the British economy all but ground 
to a halt. This occurred ~t a time when Great Britain was 
already in financial trouble due to heavy expenditures on the 
postwar Continent. The State Department ~earned on February 
3, 1947 that the British government had decided to remove its 
troops from Greece. This was followed on February 20 by 
information from the American embassy in London that the 
British might also end financial assistance to Greece. Ache-
son and Henderson uneasily noted these developments. (40) 
The Briiish government interpreted American interest in 
and aid to Greece to mean that the United States was commit-
( 3 9) See William Reitzel, Th~ Mediterranean·: ~~ ~o le in 
Am~Eica'~ Forei~£ Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Com-
pany, 1948), pp. 86-88; Feis, Tru~ to _!er.E..£!> p, 187; Law-
rence s. Wittner, Am~£!£~ ~ervent!on in Greece, 1943-1949 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982}, p. 22; Warner, 
"Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan," p. 87; and Kuniholm, 
Cold War!£~ !ast, p, 301. 
(40) see Truman, ~£ir~, 2:98-99; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, 
p. 75; Hammond, Cold ~I~~' p. 20; and Balfour, !h~ 
~~~~rs~!~~' p. 47. 
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ted to protecting Anglo-American interests in the country. 
British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and other officials 
assumed that the United States would fulfill Britain's role 
when it withdrew .. Although this was a logical assumption, 
the United States was not as anxious to assume this responsi-
bility as the British government thought. The United States 
was hesitant to make such a large financial commitment, yet 
to do nothing would mean the loss of Greece and the Northern 
Tier to the Soviet sphere of influence. (41} 
The possibility that all opposition to Soviet expansion 
into the Near East might disappear became a major concern to 
Loy Henderson. Despite his support of the United Nations 
principles, he doubted its ability to maintain world peace. 
He would later recall his lack of faith in the "U.N. boys." 
Henderson thus felt that the United States must stand against 
the aims of the Soviet Union in the Northern Tier. On Feb-
ruary 20, 1947, Henderson sent a memorandum to Dean Acheson 
entitled "Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse," which 
Acheson edited and forwarded to the Secretary of State. In 
this document, the Director of NEA spelled out the problems 
in Greece and the importance of Greece to the non-communist 
world. He recommended reorganization of the Greek government 
into a national coalition of "loyal Greek parties" and 
reforms in the corrupt civil service aided by American and 
(41) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 
186; and Reitzel, Th~ Medii~~~, p. 89. 
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British experts. To help Greece with these necessary chan-
ges, Henderson proposed that the United States extend econo-
mic and military aid. Citing the inability of the British 
government to provide the necessary funds or military equip-
ment, he recommended a direct Congressional loan a;.nd prompt 
military assistance. (42) Henderson concluded: 
Under present arrangements Greece wili receive 
neither adequate economic aid from he United States 
nor adequate military aid from Britain. 
We recommend reconsideration of our policy and 
decision to assist Greece with military equip-
ment. ( 4 3) 
As a result of this memorandum, the newly appointed Secretary 
of State George Marshall instructed Acheson on the morning of 
February 21, 1947, to prepare a bill for Congress to provide 
a direct loan to Greece. In addition, he instructed the 
department to seek executive clearance for the transference 
of military equipment to this embattled Balkan nation. Ache-
son concurred with Marshall's directives. He was well aware 
of the grave economic situation in Greece and the problem of 
Communist insurgents; however, he believed there was still 
time to implement a favorable solution. (44) 
(42) See Kuniholm, Col£ ~~E in Near ~ast, p. 292; Ache-
son, f~nt at th~ Creation, p. 217; and Dean Acheson to 
George Marshall, February 21, 1947, FRU~L 1_!1.2, V, 30-31. 
(43) Acheson to Marshall, February 21, 1947, ~~g~L 1947, 
v, 31. 
(44) Jones, Fifteen ~eeks, pp. 4, 131. 
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Time ran out several hours later when the British Ambas-
sador telephoned the department requesting an immediate 
appointment with the Secretary of State. In the Secretary's 
absence, Dean Acheson dealt with the delicate crisis. A call 
to the British embassy disclosed that Lord Inverchapel, 
the British Ambassador, had two notes dealing with a British 
decision to stop aid to Greece and Turkey which he wished to 
present to the Secretary of State. Acheson arranged for Loy 
Henderson and John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the 
Office of European Affairs, to receive copies of the notes. 
Since Hickerson had a previous appointment, Henderson met 
alone with H. M. Sichel, First Secretary of the British 
embassy, who presented copies of the two documents. (45) 
Despite the Department's awareness of the British econo-
mic situation, officials were not prepared for the content of 
the memoranda. As Dean Acheson wrote, "They were shoe-
kers."(46) Although neither was long, their content was 
overwhelming. Recounting the financial, political, and mili-
tary crisis in Greece, the first note informed the United 
States that British financial support of Greek armed forces 
would terminate on March 31 and urged the United States to 
decide whether it could assume the financial responsibi-
(45) Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 4-5. 
(46) Acheson, Present at~ Creation, p. 217. 
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lity. (47) It went on to state: 
Since, however, the United States Government have 
indicated the very great importance which they 
attach to helping Greece, His Majesty's Government 
trust ~hat the United States Government may find it 
possible to afford financial assistance to Greece 
on a scale sufficient to meet her minimum needs, 
both civil and military. (48) 
The note on Greece concluded with the hope that the United 
States would respond favorably to this posit ion. ( 4 9) 
The memorandum on Turkey was even briefer. Even though 
the Turkish situation was not as critical as that in Greece, 
the British felt that Turkey would not be able to carry out 
needed plans for both economic development and military reor-
ganization without foreign aid. Since Great Britain was in 
no position to provide further financial assistance, Turkey 
would have to look to the United States. The note suggested 
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and 
Great Britain consider measures for the improvement of the 
Turkish armed forces and means for financing such a prog-
ram. (50) 
Henderson immediately realized the significance of the 
notes. With the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey, 
(47) British Embassy to Department of State, February 
21, 1947, FR~ .!1_!.l, V, 33. 
(48) British Embassy to Department of State, February 
21, 1947, FRUSL ];_947, V, 34-35. 
(49) Ibid., 35. 
(50) Ibid., 35-37. 
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it appeared that Great Britain was reducing its role in 
world affairs and was asking the United States to take over 
the job. No area was of greater importance to Western secu-
rity than Greece and Turkey. The United States was now faced 
with a dilemma. Historically, the American government was 
reluctant to involve the nation in international commitments, 
but the abandonment of Greece meant the vital Near and Middle 
East would be lost to the Soviet sphere of influence. (51) 
The facts of the British memoranda were not new to the 
State Department, but the United States suddenly confronted a 
six weeks deadline to shape a policy. Henderson immediately 
went to see Dean Acheson to discuss the British notes. Ache-
son agreed that the United States had to act quickly, but 
only Congress could grant the large level of funds necessary 
to provide adequate aid to Greece and Turkey. To NEA the 
situation was clear. Either give the needed assistance to 
Greece and Turkey, or accept Soviet domination of the Near 
and Middle East. For Henderson and Acheson there was only 
one decision, and the State Department had to execute that 
decision immediately. Acheson asked Henderson to mobilize 
his staff in order to prepare a policy statement on the 
Greek-Turkish situation for the Secretary of State by Monday. 
He also instructed the Director to show him the NEA memoran-
(51) See Jones, Fifteen ~ks, p. 7; and Stephen G. 
Xydis, Gr~~ and the Great Powers 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki: 
In.stitute for Balk~;--Studies, 1963)~487:" 
dum upon its completion. With this charge Loy Henderson took 
the lead in preparing a program to aid these nations. (52) 
Henderson assembled his best qualified staff, including 
Henry Villard, Jack Jernigan, and William Baxter. Working 
under Henderson's direction nearly around the clock from Fri-
day evening through Sunday morning, these men prepared a 
position document entitled, "Position and Recommendations of 
the Department of State Regarding Immediate and Substantial 
Aid to Greece and Turkey." The paper made clear the depart-
ment's conviction that.the United States should accept the 
new responsibility and alleviate the crisis in Greece. Hen-
derson recommended that the departments of State, War, Navy, 
and Treasury discuss the Greek-Turkish affair and present 
their findings to the President. A consensus of need for aid 
would necessitate consultation with Congressional leaders and 
drafting of legislation. The paper also recommended advising 
the American people of the grave state of affairs in Greece 
and Turkey. (53) John H.· Stutesman wrote of Henderson's 
influence on the memorandum: 
(52) See Jones, Fifteen Week~, pp. 7-8, 131; Kuniholm, 
Cold ~~E in Near Ea~, pp. 7-8, 10; and Henderson to Kennan 
(draft), April 2,. 1967, LWH Papers. Henderson's account of 
the weekend of February 21-23 does not always agree with that 
of Jones. Where discrepancies occur, Henderson's version has 
been used. 
(53) see Henderson to Kennan (draft), April 2, 1967, LWH 
Papers; Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, undated, KRU~L 1.1i2, 
v, 52-55; and Stutesman Thesis, LWH Papers. 
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Drafting the President's speech proved to be a difficult 
assignment. Loy Henderson, Gordon Merriam, and Joseph Jones 
drafted preliminary versions of the message. Although none 
became the final message, Acheson now had a valuable guide. 
The Under Secretary of State personally presided over a 
drafting conference on March 4 but chose Jones to prepare the 
final message. In preparing the speech and legislation, 
Jones and Acheson chose to minimize the questions of national 
security and military aid, since the department did not want 
to alarm the American people. 
the economic issues. (56) 
Instead the draft emphasized 
When Dean Acheso.n and George Marshall met with President 
Truman and Congressional leaders, the Secretary of State 
presented the State Department's draft and explanation. 
Sensing they were not impressed, Acheson proceeded to recount 
instances of Soviet aggression in the Near.East and the 
threat of Soviet influence spreading to other areas. The 
Under Secretary's remarks persuaded Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg, and he agreed to support the program. According to 
Acheson, Vandenberg stated, "Mr. President, if you will say 
that to the Congress and the country, I will support you and 
I believe that most of its members will do the same."(57) 
Despite his dislike of "crisis diplomacy," the Senator 
(56) Jones, ~i!~ weeks, pp. 143-44, 153, 163. 
(57) Acheson, Pr~~nt ~~ th~ fEeati.£.!2, p. 219. 
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believed that American self-interest should be coupled with 
positive action. A broader scope also appealed to the Presi-
dent who thought the State Department's draft sounded like an 
"investment prospectus." Mr. Truman and Clark Clifford 
edited the speech to place its emphasis on the broad issues 
~ 
of world affairs. (58) 
' . 
' ' 
During the weeks of preparation, Henderson kept the 
Greek government abreast of developments. On February 28, he 
informed the Greek Charge d'Affaires, Paul Economou-Gouras, 
of the British retrenchment and of the intention of the 
United States to offer substantial assistance. Henderson 
helped Economou-Gouras draft a request for aid on behalf of 
the Greek government so that the United States could avoid 
the appearance of interfering in the internal affairs of a 
foreign state. The extent of the United States investment 
meant, however, that the American government would interfere 
considerably in Greek internal affairs. Henderson under-
scored the necessity for the complete cooperation of the 
Greek government. On March 10, the Director of NEA expressed 
optimism to the Charge d'Affaires that the bill for Greek aid 
would receive Congressional approval despite the growing 
(58) See Richard M. Freeland, !h~ Tr_!:!!!!an Doctrine ~~ 
the Qrigins £!McCarthyism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 
pp. 97-98; and Vandenberg, Private f~E..~.t pp. 340, 347. 
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feeling that the United Nations, rather than a single nation, 
should at on this matter. (59) 
The situation in Turkey was not quite as clear cut. 
Acheson suggested that Henderson meet with George Kennan, 
then serving as Faculty Advisor at the National War College, 
in order to obtain his ideas on the situation in Turkey and 
Greece. Kennan supported Greek aid, but he believed that 
assistance to Turkey could possibly lead to armed conflict 
with the Soviet Union. Henderson, however, felt that ignor-
ing Turkish needs would be demoralizing enough to the Turks 
to move them to give up their anti-Soviet stand. Even though 
Turkey's internal affairs were relatively stable, department 
officials were alarmed over the consequences of possible 
Soviet control in Turkey. The country would be dangerously 
weakened by its military expenses if American assistance did 
not fill the void of British withdrawal. Kennan apparently 
shared his concerns with Acheson, but Turkey remained a part 
of the program. (60) 
(59) Xydis, Q~ce and the Great Pow~~' pp. 478-79, 
486. 
(60) see George S. Harris, Troubled Allianc.e: ~£Ekish= 
~~~EiC~~ Prob!~~ i~ Historic~! ~er~E~ctiv~ l.2.i~-192.!. (Wash-
ington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1972), p. 26; and Henderson to Kennan (draft), 
April 2, 1967, LWH Papers. Henderson disagreed with Kennan's 
account of the latter's involvement in the preparation of the 
Truman Doctrine. Once more Henderson's version has been 
used. He verified his recollections with Villard, Baxter, 
and Acheson. 
70 
Even though assistance to Turkey remained in the pro-
posed aid program, it did not include aid for Iran, the third 
country of the Northern Tier. Henderson had given considera-
tion to including Iran in the NEA proposal, but he abandoned 
the idea since the British had not mentioned that they were 
relinquishing their role in Iran. He was keenly aware of 
British possessiveness of the Persian Gulf region from his 
service in Iraq. The State Department decided that there was 
no immediate threat to Iran's independence internally or ex-
ternally, and that Congress might be reluctant enough to aid 
the hard pressed Greeks and Turks. Henderson encouraged 
Iran, however, to seek credit through ordinary channels. (61) 
Thus with Turkey in and Iran out, President Harry Truman 
delivered his address to a joint session of Congress on March 
12, 1947. Robert J. Donovan called it "probably the most 
enduringly controversial speech that has been made by a 
president in the twentieth century."(62) According to Daniel 
Yergin, " it was deliberately written as a 'sales job.' 
. the All-out speech represented a deliberate effort to 
create a public consensus for the private beliefs within the 
(61) See Kuniholm, fold War in ~~ ~~~~' p. 409; memo-
randum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Gholam Aram 
(Iranian Embassy), April 14, 1947, FRUS, 1942, V, 905. 
(62) Robert J. Donovan, ~!lie~ ~nd Crisis~ !he Presi-
£~~£Y £! HarEY ~~ Tr~~!!.L. 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1977), p. 283. 
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Administration."(63) John Gaddis concisely called the speech 
"a form of shock therapy."(64) Truman set the tone in the 
first few sentences when he maintained that the situation 
involved national security as well as foreign policy. He 
explained the Greek crisis in vivid terms and the urgent need 
for a United States response due to the pending British with-
drawal. The President avoided mention of the Greek govern-
ment's problems, while emphasizing its democratic aims. His 
reference to Turkey was brief, merely stating that Turkey 
needed United States assistance in order to maintain its 
national integrity. He set the price of peace and security 
at four hundred million dollars. The remainder of the Presi-
dent's address placed the Greek and Turkish situations into 
the perspective of world affairs. (65) Truman said: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every 
nation must choose between alternative ways of 
life. . One way of life is based upon the will 
of the majority. The second way of life is 
based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed 
upon the majority. I believe that we must 
assist free peoples· to work out their own destinies 
in their own way. (66) 
There were thus two main themes in President Truman's 
speech. One dealt with the foreign economic responsibilities 
(63) Yergin, Shattered Pe~, p. 283. 
(64) Gaddis, Origin~£! !he££!£ War, p. 351. 
(65) Public Pa~E~ of !h~ Presidents of ~h~ Unite£ 
~!~~es~ ~~y ~~ Truman, !2.i.1. (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1963), pp. 176-80. 
(66) Ibid., pp. 178-79. 
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of the United States, and the other expressed American con-
cern over the spread of totalitarianism, more specifically 
communism. This emphasis led many to view the speech as a 
commitment to help all free nations resist communism. (67) 
Reactions to President Truman's address were numerous 
and varied. Greece, of course, had been waiting anxiously 
for promised United States assistance, but Turkey was some-
what surprised by the urgency of the President's comments. 
Although it welcomed aid in improving its armed forces, some 
Turkish officials feared it would lead to American interven-
tion in Turkish internal affairs. There was also concern 
about the vagueness of the American commitment to Turkey and 
how long the financial aid would last. Despite some appre-
hension Turkey was pleased with the security that arose from 
association with the United States. (68) 
European reaction was mixed. In Great Britain the 
Foreign Office was elated, but the Labour Party government 
accused the United States of attempting to establish an 
empire. Most European leaders saw the program as an exten-
sion of American influence, but they differed in their feel-
ings about this occurrence. Generally, those seeking an 
obstacle to Soviet expansion applauded the President's 
speech, while communists and socialists expressed their dis-
(67) See Freeland, Truman Doctrine and McCart£yis~, p. 
86.; and Jones, Fifteen We~, p. 12. 
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pleasure. The reaction from the Soviet Union was particu-
larly virulent, accusing the United States of expansion, but 
Stalin made no move to retaliate. In Yugoslavia Tito charged 
"American imperialism" with threatening war. (69) 
Trµman's speech received both praise and criticism from 
American officials. Loy Henderson lauded the doctrine as an 
example of American "determination to preserve freedom and 
independence," while George Kennan recalled that he criti-
cized the speech at the time precisely because of this broad 
commitment. Kennan felt that the grandiose language of the 
address implied that United States action in response to the 
Greek crisis would be taken anywhere in the world such cir-
cumstances arose. He did not oppose the specific decision to 
aid Greece and Turkey, but rather the universal policy that 
seemed to grow from the speech. Kennan believed that such a 
policy was not only questionable but impossible. Walter 
Lippmann criticized Truman for beginning a world-wide crusade 
on behalf of democracy rather than dealing with a single 
American security issue. Henry Wallace charged the President 
with creating a crisis when he should have been revitalizing 
the Greek economy. Truman later acknowledged the risks that 
were involved with this policy, but he believed the risks 
(69) See European reaction in Wittner, American In~~= 
vention, pp. 82-84; see Soviet reaction in Soviet New~, 15 
March 1947, p. 4, reprinted in Schlesinger, £ynamics of World 
~OW~Er 2:314-15. 
were necessary to protect the freedom and security of free 
people. ( 7 0) 
Despite criticism of the President's address, the bill 
to aid Greece and Turkey moved rapidly through Congress. 
Public hearings began the next week, and debate in the Senate 
commenced on April 8. Although there was little delay, the 
path was far from smooth. Supporters of the President 
stressed the need to maintain his credibility. Even Senator 
Robert Taft of Ohio, who had long warned against overcommit-
ment, was afraid of how opposition would affect Truman's 
ability to bargain. Congressional critics, however, were 
outspoken. Isolationists such a Lawrence H. Smith (Republi-
can - Ohio) charged the President with bending to the will of 
the large oil companies. In the process the United States 
was bolstering reactionary, undemocratic governments. Of 
major concern also was the high cost. William Lempke (Repub-
lican - North Dakota) and Senator c. Wayland Brooks. (Republi-
can - Illinois) accused the Pre0sident of imperialism that 
could lead to war, while Harold Knutson (Republican - Minne-
sota) and Senator William Langer (Republican - North Dakota) 
complained abo~t the bypassing of the United Nations. Sena-
tor Vandenberg, however, succeeded in having the bill amended 
to bring it under the United Nations Charter by giving that 
(70) See Henderson, "Political and Strategic Interests," 
p. 1000; Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 319-20; Bernstein, "Lippmann 
and the Early Cold War," p. 40; Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. 
Liggio, "Henry A. Wallace and the Open Door," in Paterson, 
££1£ Wa£ Critics, p. 94; and Truman, ~emoirs, 2:101. 
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body authority to halt the program if conditions warranted. 
Dean Acheson tried to draw attention away from the global 
implications of the doctrine by emphasizing the idea of 
economic reconstruction. He insisted that the United States 
would consider each request for aid on its own merits. The 
bill passed the Senate on April 22, with two-thirds of th~ 
old isolationists voting for it, and a slightly diiferent 
version passed in the House of Representatives on May B. 
After the necessary compromise, the bill was approved in both 
houses on May 15. On May 22, 1947, President Harry S. Truman 
signed the bill to aid Greece and Turkey. (71) 
Loy Henderson kept a close eye on the aid program in 
Greece. Almost from the beginning, some accused the American 
Mission for Aid to Greece, headed by Dwight Griswold, of 
intervening in Greek politics. The Director of NEA acknowl-
edged the need for changes in the Greek government, but he 
urged Griswold to be discreet. Griswold did not heed the 
warning, however, so Henderson went to Greece to ease tension 
and help resolve the situation. With American Ambassador 
Lincoln MacVeagh, Henderson was able to negotiate a center-
right coalition government. This obvious political interven-
(71) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confro~tation, pp. 
200-02; see role of isolationists in Congressional hearings 
and details of Senate vote in Doenecke, Not !£ the ~wift, pp. 
74-79, 82, 86; Vandenberg, Private ~~~.E!!., p. 350.; Freeland, 
Truman Doctrine an£ McCarthyism, pp. lOB-09; John L. Gaddis, 
~wa;-the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Forei~~ 
~ffair~ 52:2(January 1974): 390; and Kuniholm, Cold WaE in 
~~ar !~!· p. 414. 
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tion as well as the growing use of propaganda in the Balkans 
were controversial issues. Henderson, however, supported 
both intervention and propaganda along with the use of the 
military if it was needed to save Greece from communist 
aggression. (72) Henderson did not see American intervention 
as a threat to Greek sovereignty because the United States 
had no designs on. this or any other nation. It merely wanted 
to rescue Greece from economic and communist deprivat·ion. 
The program to aid Greece and Turkey was one of the 
earliest "costs of containment." For years Henderson 
stressed the need to bolster American interests through eco-
nomic assistance. He believed that nations with stablized 
economies could meet the challenges of communist propagarida. 
Later events of the Cold War, such as the Berlin blockade and 
the Korean conflict, confirmed the global implications of the 
Truman Doctrine speech, but the speech overshadowed the real 
purpose of the Greek-Turkish aid program - to strengthen 
these nations to resist the threat of communism. While 
Kennan, Jones, and others acknowledged Henderson's contribu-
tions to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, their focus 
on the consequences of the speech overshadowed the fact that 
the original aid program was the product of Loy Henderson and 
the NEA staff. 
(72) see details of Henderson's activities in Greece in 
Wittner, American Interve£tion, pp. 104-05, 111-13, 160-61, 
237-39. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE VILLAIN: 
HENDERSON AND THE PALESTINE CRISIS 
On May 21, 1947, Loy Henderson wrote, "Crisis seems to 
be our normal state."(l) Congress was still debating the 
Greek-Turkish aid bill when a special session of the United 
Nati9ns General Assembly began considering the Palestine 
issue. What seemed an appropriate policy for Greece and 
Turkey was not as workable in the Arab areas of the Near and 
Middle East. Economic aid programs were of little use to the 
backward, agrarian economies of these peoples. They lacked 
the institutional means of. carrying out such programs, and 
the Arabs were reluctant to develop institutions which they 
considered Western and foreign. The establishment of a 
foreign policy for these areas was further complicated by the 
Arab-Jewish conflict which raged in Palestine. Not only did 
it create instability in an oil-rich part of the world, 
making it ripe for the feared communist expansion, but it 
split the heretofore united front presented by the United 
States and Great Britain. (2) Twenty years later a critic 
(1) Loy Henderson to Carmel Office, May 21, 1947, Near 
Eastern Affairs, 1945-48, Substantive File, LWH Papers. 
(2) See Henderson to Office, May 21, 1947, LWH Papers; 
and Reitzel, g£it~£ ~~ates FoE~i~£ ~£licy, pp. 209-11. 
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wrote in a book review, "If God as some now say is dead, He 
no doubt died of trying to find an equitable solution to the 
Arab-Jewish problem."(3) This conflict in Palestine pre-
sented the American government with a unique policy problem. 
The land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan 
River had occupied a special place in the hearts of Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims for centuries, but the American gov-
ernment took only a vague interest in Palestine prior to the 
1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate which fixed its 
borders. With the emergence o~ Palestine as a political 
entity, the United States faced the challenge of formulating 
an appropriate foreign policy. During the interwar years, 
the complexities of the Palestine situation came to the fore. 
The. plight of European Jews dur~ng World War II heightened 
inierest in Palestine as did the growing fear of the Soviet 
menace. It seemed that every corner of the world had a stake 
in the fate of the area. (4) 
The concerns of th~ British, Arabs, and Jews are simply 
stated. To Great Britain Ealestine was an integral part of 
her colonial empire, and the British faced the same problem 
there as in their other colonies - growing nationalism. Arab 
(3) I. F. Stone, "For a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab 
Conflict," New !.£.E~ Review of.!!.£.£~~,. 3 August 1967, p. 5, 
Israel-Palestine Printed Material File, Container 11, LWH 
Papers. 
(4) See Peretz, Mi££le Ea~~ Today, pp. 265-66; and 
Milton Plesur, "The Relations Between the United States and 
Palestine (1917-1945)," ~E.£ai~, 3:4(1954), p. 469. 
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and Jewish nationalists were in constant conflict with the 
British authorities and with each other. The Arab majority 
viewed the land as rightfully theirs, while the Zionists were 
determined to have Palestine for their national home. (5) 
In the United States the issues were more complex. The 
situation in Palestine was both a domestic issue and a 
foreign policy issue. A large part of the American Jewish 
population supported Zionist aspirations, and their potential 
voting strength forced politicians to take notice. When 
combined with the humanitarian desire for the permanent set-
tlement of Europe's displaced Jews, Zionist influence on 
American politics was inescapable. Because of the political 
pressure on elected officials, Henderson believed that the 
State Department had to mainta~n a completely objective point 
of view. He assessed the situation in Palestine without 
emotion, prejudice, or political considerations. In this 
manner the departments of State and Defense viewed the Pales-
tine issue in the contex·t of American foreign policy and 
world affairs. With the United States embarking on a policy 
of Soviet containment, the experts in these departments 
believed that Arab oil was vital. Henderson and other policy 
makers in State and Defense were convinced that it was neces-
sary to strengthen relations with the Arab nations, not 
alienate them by a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. The 
( 5 ) ·p e re t z , !1idd1 e East Tod a y, pp . 1 0 7 - 0 8 . 
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conflict that existed between the domestic concerns, usually 
voiced by the White House Staff, and the foreign policy 
concerns of the two departments resulted in confusion and 
mistrust among the presidential advisors. (6) 
At the core of the Palestine issue for many Americans, 
including Henderson, was the question of self-determination. 
In the Atlantic Charter of 1941, President Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Churchill agreed, among other things, that 
their countries would "respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live. 
• " ( 7) Conflict and contradictions arose over this issue . It 
was impossible to reconcile the Arab majority's call for 
self-government with the 1917 Balfour Declaration's promise 
of a Jewish national home in Palestine. (8) American Director 
of Economic Operations in the Middle East, James M. Landis, 
wrote to President Roosevelt in January 1945, "The political 
objective implicit in the Jewish State idea will never be 
accepted by the Arab nations and is not consistent with the 
( 6) See John Snetsinger, .!.E~.!!..L . .!:_he Jewi!!_h Vot~.L ~.!!.£ 
.!:_he ~_E~ati.£1! of Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1974), pp. 12, 14-15; Margaret Arakie, ~rake!!. Swo_££ of~~!!..::. 
!i£~ America.!. .!.!!._Eael ~nd .!:_he ~ales.!:_in~ Tr~~~£y (London: 
Quartet Books, 1973), p. 60; Wilson, Decision on ~~le!!.!i.!!.~· 
p. 11; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers. 
( 7) 
1939-1945 
5 0 • 
Harley Notter, ~£!!_twar Forei~ Policy Pre~_Eatio.!!..L 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 
(8) Wilson, Decision on Pa!estin~, p. xv. 
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principles of the Atlantic Charter."(9) Henderson feared 
that the abandonment of the principle of self-determination 
in Palestine would harm American prestige. Other nations 
would judge the United States as no more trustworthy than the 
Soviet Union. (10) 
Prior to World War II, United States government interest 
in Palestine was limited. The State Department usually 
filled foreign service posts in the Near East with officers 
well acquainted with the area. As in the Far Eastern Divi-
sion, the unique problems of these non-Western territories 
required the diplomatic skills of knowledgeable officers. 
The close association between the foreign service officers 
serving in the Near E.ast and the Arab nations gave rise to 
charges of pro-Arabism and even anti-Semitism. Indeed the 
·State Department was generally sympathetic to the Arabs' 
desire for self-government, and it believed that the Arab 
majority would succeed to power when the Mandate ended. The 
department thus considered Zionist goals in Palestine a 
detriment to American relations and interests in the Near 
East although every president since Woodrow Wilson affirmed 
United States support for the Jewish National Home. (11) 
(9) Director of Economic Operations in Middle East (Lan-
dis) to Roosevelt, January 30, 1945, FRUS, 12.!11 VIII, 681. 
(10) Loy Henderson to Allen H. Podet, June 9, 1976, 
Israel-Palestine File, LWH Papers. 
(11) See Baram, £~£artm~nt £f State i£ ~idd!~ ~ast, pp. 
51-52; and Wilson, Decision££ ~~~sti£~· pp. 6-7, 18. 
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Other than the obvious importance of Near Eastern oil to 
the war effort, American government interest in Palestine was 
also in the background during the war years. The United 
States, however, realized the necessity for postwar planning 
for the Near East. A series of State Department studies 
attempted to determine the basis for a Palestinian settle-
ment. In all, the Near East Office prepared ten comprehen-
sive planning papers for Palestine. Despite this planning, a 
definite formula for Palestine proved to be elusive. (12) 
The State Department was not alone in the making of pre-
parations for postwar Palestine. As the horrors of European 
Jewry emerged, Zionist activities in the United States in-
creased rapidly. Zionist leadership centered in Europe prior 
to the war, but the 1942 Zionist conference in New York sig-
naled the shift in leadership to the United States. The 
Zionists embarked on a propaganda campaign intended to win 
the support of the American people and government for the 
Jewish State. The idea.was to link the Jewish refugee prob-
lem with the need for a Jewish nation. (13) 
The Zionist campaign was an overwhelming success. All 
areas of the government began to feel pressure to support 
(12) See Evan M. Wilson, "The Palestine Papers, 1943-
1947," Jo~~! of Palestine Studies 2 (Summer 1973): 49; Moha-
mmed K. Shadid, ~ United State~~££ th~ ~~.J:.estini~£~ (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 29; and "Palestine: Form 
of Government," prepared by State Department, January 30, 
1945, FR~ 11~ 1 VIII, 683. 
(13) Wilson, ~~cisi££ ££ ~ale~~in~, pp. 24-25, 30-31. 
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Zionism. In 1944 Congressional resolutions supporting Zion-
ist aims passed overwhelmingly in both houses of Congress. 
In the summer of 1944, both parties included planks in their 
presidential campaign platforms backing Zionist aims. The 
Jews, however, were not the only ethnic or national group 
with a refugee problem, and the narrow focus on displaced 
Jews greatly concerned Henderson. State Department pleas for 
restraint still went unheeded. (14) 
The State Department was especially concerned about the 
effect that American Zionist activity had on the Arab world. 
Arab leaders were anxious and confused about the United 
States position on Paleitine. These concerns were expressed 
to President Roosevelt in a letter from King Ibn Saud of 
Saudi Arabia in 1943. In reply the President promised that 
the United States government would take no actions regarding 
the situation in Palestine without first consulting both 
Arabs and Jews. This formula of full cosultation was the 
first formal American policy on Palestine. Though vague, and 
open to wide interpretation, it provided Henderson and NEA 
with a guideline in dealing with disgruntled Arab leaders. (15) 
Roosevelt never formulated a coherent policy on Pales-
tine. He was sympathetic to the Zionists and was aware of 
(14) See Wilson, De£isio~ .£!!. Palestine, pp. 40-44; and 
Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, March 13, 1977, Lilien-
thal File, LWH Papers. 
the political strength of this segment of the population; 
however, he also knew that not all American Jews supported 
Zionism, nor could a Jewish State survive without military 
force. The situation in Palestine, while important, was not 
a critical issue during the war years, and Roosevelt success-
fully evaded a decisive position. He believed he could find 
a solution to the conflict in Palestine after the war. (16) 
By 1945 it was obvious the issue of Palestine was going 
to be one of the major challenges of the immediate postwar 
years. Roosevelt revealed his concern when he included a 
meeting with Ibn Saud as part of his agenda for the Yalta 
Conference. Despite promises to Ibn Saud, the President con-
tinually vacillated as the American wartime feeling was 
decidedly pro-Zionist. On March 16, 1945, Roosevelt auth-
orized Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Chairman of the American Zio-
nist Emergency Council, to make a statement affirming his 
support of Jewish aspirations in Palestine. (17) On April 5, 
however, the President sent a letter to Saud reaffirming the 
policy of full consultation. Roosevelt wrote, "Your Majesty 
will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversa-
(16) See Wilson, Decision££ falesti£~, pp. 54-56; and 
Wilson, "Palestine Papers," p. 40. 
(17) See Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: 
A Lesson in Pressure Politics," Middle East JO££!!~.!. 2 (Janu-
ary, 1948): 4-5; Wilson, Deci~i££ ££Palestine, 28, 37, 51, 
53; and Wallace Murray to Joseph Grew, March 20, 1945, K~~ 
.!2..!~.t VIII, 694. 
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discontent by reaffirming American commitment to full cosul-
tation in letters to Arab leaders. (20) 
This marked the last time, however, that the State 
Department was able to influence Truman's Palestine policy. 
Perhaps one reason for this was the lack of interest of Stet-
tinius' successors. James Byrnes was seldom in Washington. 
One official complained, "The State Department fiddles while 
Byrnes roams."(21) Byrnes wanted no part of the Palestine 
affair and left it almost entirely to the new Under Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson. Secretary of State George Marshall 
also delegated Palestine issues to the Under Secretary since 
he viewed the problems as being more domestic than foreign in 
character. According to Loy Henderson, Marshall only gave 
his personal attention in cases of "extreme urgency." Under 
Byrnes and Marshall, therefore, the Director of NEA in con-
sultation with the Under Secretary dealt with routine issues. 
Under this format the White House decided policy questions 
almost entirely on its own. (22) 
Truman's view of Palestine was simple in 1945. He 
wanted the British to open Palestine to the immediate immi-
(20) see Wilson, Decision on f~le~ine, 59-60; and Tru-
man, Memoirs, 2:132-33. 
(21) Joseph Alsop to Martin Sommers, 
Joseph w. Alsop Papers, Box 1, Library of 
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold ~~E, p. 347. 
February 3, 1946, 
Congress, quoted in 
(22) see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 
man, Mem£ir~, 2:132-33; and Henderson Interview, 
1975, LWH Papers. 
59-60; Tru-
October 15, 
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gration of 100,000 Jews then occupying displaced persons 
camps in Europe, but he did not want to assume responsibility 
for such action either politically or militarily. The Presi-
dent believed that the western world must keep the Balfour 
Declaration's "solemn promise" of a Jewish homeland in Pales-
tine. Truman regarded this promise as fundamental to the 
principle of self-determination, a principle which he 
affirmed in his Navy Day speech on October 27, 1945, stating, 
"We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part 
of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the people concerned."(23) His view seemed to 
ignore, however, the question of self-determination for the 
Arab majority. (24) 
The State Department was well aware that American sup-
port of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine would 
generate hostility in the Arab world. The President, though, 
was more concerned with the Jewish refugee problem than with 
State Department warnings of reprecussions in the Arab world. 
Deeply troubled by this situation, Truman's solution to the 
refugee problem was the lifting of British immigration 
restrictions in Palestine. After Earl G. Harrison, the 
(23) Louis w. Koenig, ed., The !~~£ Administration: 
Its Princi~ ~nd Practices. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
Publishers, 1956), p. 262. 
(24) See Acheson, f~ent at the Cre~~ion, p. 170; 
Truman, Memoirs, 2:132-33; and Shadid, United Stat~~ and 
f~l~~tini~£~· p. 33. 
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United States representative on the Intergovernmental Commit-
tee on Refugees, reported on conditions in the displaced 
persons camps and the desire of the Jews to go to Palestine, 
Truman again urged the British to open Palestine to Jewish 
refugees. Truman, however, overlooked the other displaced 
persons of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. 
The President's disregard of the broader refugee problem 
deeply concerned Loy Henderson. In Henderson's view none of 
the displaced person's had an ethnic sanctuary. (25) 
President Truman focused his efforts on an immediate 
solution to the Jewish refugee problem. He viewed the short 
and long-range considerations as completely separate. Truman 
believed the question of a Jewish State was a matter that the 
United Nations should address at a later date. (26) In his 
Me!!!oirs the President later wrote, "In my own mind, the aims 
and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish 
state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding 
means to relieve the human misery of the displaced per-
sons."(27) 
(25) see Snetsinger, TrumanL th~ Jewish Vo~, p. 17; 
Truman, Memoirs, 2:132; Clark M. Clifford, "Factors Influenc-
ing President Truman's Decision to Support Partition and 
Recognize the State of· Israel," The f~_!estin~ Question in 
~!!!~Eican History (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 25-26; and 
Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, March 13, 1977, LWH 
Papers. 
(26) see Truman, Memoirs, 2:140; and Acheson, fresent at 
the Cre~!i£~· p. 170. 
{ 2 7) Truman·, Me!!!£ig, 2: 14 4- 4 5. 
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His Palestine policy satisfied no one. The British 
resented Truman's pressure to increase immigration into their 
Mandate territory, for they had to consider both the Arabs 
and the Jews. The Zionists wanted the administration to 
endorse the Jewish State. The Arabs viewed Truman's position 
as hostile. (28) Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha 
wrote, "Why, from a perfectly objective point of view, one 
small nation of 1,000,000 people living in a small territory 
should be forced to accept in 25 years immigrants of an alien 
race up to nearly 50 per cent of their own number is hard to 
understand."(29) 
Loy Henderson realized the problems involved with any 
policy that gave advantage to one side over the other. He 
suggested to Secretary Byrnes that the United States try to 
reach an agreement with the British, Soviets, and French for 
the future of Palestine. In this way no one country would 
have to bear the responsibility. Henderson recommended a 
Palestine trusteeship with Jewish and Arab autonomy. (30) 
Whether the President learned of this advice is unknown, 
but Truman continued to follow his own course. (31) 
(28) See Snetsinger, Trum~ th~ Jewish Vote, 
British Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, 
16, 1945, I~USL 1945, VIII, 740. 
(29) Truman, ~~oirs, 2:134. 
As early 
p. 18; and 
September 
(30) See Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 170; and 
Wilson, Decision ££ ~~lestine, p. 66. 
(31) Acheson, ~E~~~nt ~! !£~ £reati££, p. 170. 
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as September 1945 Gordon Merriam wrote to Henderson, "It 
seems apparent to me that the President (and perhaps Mr. 
Byrnes as well) have decided to have a go at Palestine nego-
tiations without bringing NEA into the picture. ."(32) 
In October 1945 the President agreed to join with the British 
in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The 
British suggested that the committee study the problem of 
Europe's displaced Jews with Palestine as one possible alter-
native for meeting their needs. As the Mandate authority, 
the British realized the hostility that existed between Arabs 
and Jews because of their conflicting aspirations in Pales-
tine. Great Britain feared that any change in immigration 
policies would only add fuel to the fires of discontent. 
Unknown to the State Department, President Truman informed 
the British that the United States would only take part in 
the committee if Palestine was the focal point. The British 
reluctantly agreed. The Anglo-American approach to the Pal-
estine issue without including the other major powers gave 
the Soviets the opportunity to incite Jewish and Arab opposi-
tion to the committee's proposals. Henderson's concern that 
the United States would have to bear responsibility for 
Palestine proved correct. (33) 
(32) Merriam to Henderson, September 26, 1945, fRUS, 
l1i~' VIII, 745-46. 
(33) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:141-42; Acheson, Pr~sen~ ~~ 
the Creation, p. 172; Alfred W. Lilienthal to Loy Henderson, 
February 16, 1977, and Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, 
March 13, 1977, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers. 
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Despite the administration's apparent lack of interest 
in the department's advice, Henderson continued to express 
his views on the Near East. Early in 1946 he prepared a 
memorandum for Acheson and Hickerson offering his opinion on 
the danger the Near East presented to world peace. He stated 
that America's most important interest in the area was not 
oil, but the preservation of stability and the principles of 
the United Nations in order to prevent actions that might 
lead to another world war. Henderson explained that the 
Great Powers were pursuing four different policies in the 
area. The United States was not going to use force to imple-
ment its policies, nor was it inclined to provide the econo-
mic assistance needed in the Near East. He further stated 
that America's seeming support for the Zionist cause in 
Palestine which was opposed by two-thirds of the population 
was having an adverse effect on attempts to carry out govern-
ment policies in the region. Henderson was aware of the 
growing nationalism in the Arab world and of the people's 
desire to improve their living standards. He believed that 
only political and economic stability would protect the Near 
East from outside powers. As in Greece and Turkey Henderson 
urged that the United States economically aid in developing 
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Near Eastern countries and encourage the adoption of American 
principles. (34) 
While Henderson's advice appeared to fall on deaf ears 
in the White House, the report of the Committee of Inquiry 
supported several of his earlier suggestions. Published on 
May 1, 1946, the report pr~posed ten points regarding Pales-
tine. The committee stressed the necessity of adopting the 
entirety of its proposal with concessions balanced on each 
side. The report stated that while Palestine offered the 
best location for settling large numbers of displaced Jews, 
it could not and should not bear the entire burden. The 
report recommended the immigration of 100,000 Jews but prohi-
bited either the Jews or the Arabs from dominating the other. 
Since there was so much hostility, the committee recommended 
continuation of the Mandate until the establishment of a 
United Nations trusteeship. Arabs and Jews should have equal 
educational, political, and economic qpportunities under both 
the Mandate and the trusteeship. (35) Henderson praised the 
report for being "a thorough and conscientious piece of work" 
which "produced a set of general recommendations which con-
(34) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson and John Hicker-
son, "The Present Situation in the Near East - A Danger to 
World Peace," undated, Ig~ 194~, VII, 1-4; and Henderson, 
I2reig~ Policies, pp. 14-16. 
(35) See Wilson, Decision~ Palestine, p. 87; and Dean 
Acheson to American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, April 
25, 1946, FRUS.L 1946, VII, 585-86. 
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stitute a reasonable and intelligently-defined compromise 
solution. • " ( 3 6) 
Feelings toward the report outside of the State Depart-
ment were not quite so positive. Truman endorsed the admis-
sion of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and several other of the 
points, but he reserved judgment on the rest of the report 
pending further study. His partial acceptance angered the 
British. Prime Minister Clement Attlee stated that Great 
Britain would not undertake the long-term commitments the 
report required until it determined how much responsibility 
the United States would share. He also rejected the admis-
sion of 100,000 Jewish immigrants as long as Jewish terrorism 
continued since the United States was unwilling to accept 
obligations in Palestine which would require a military pres-
ence. In the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
reported that not only would military involvement harm Ameri-
can interests in the Near East but that the armed forces did 
not have enough manpower to police the region in light of 
other commitments. (37) 
Jews and Arabs alike strongly opposed the committee 
report. The Zionists wanted a Jewish State, and the Arabs 
desired an Arab State. The trusteeship proposal satisfied 
(36) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, April 24, 1946, 
fRU~ 1946, VII, 587. 
(37) See Wilson, Decision Q!! Palesti!!~.r p, 89; Truman, 
Memoirs, 2:149; and Joint Chiefs ~f Staff to State-War-Navy 
C~~~cti~ating Committee, June 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 632. 
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neither group. The Arabs especially resented the interfer-
ence of the American government in the affairs of an Arab 
country. (38) 
Despite the lack of agreement on the Report of the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquizy, Truman continued to 
press the British for the admittance of 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine. Henderson suggested that the administration 
needed more than pressure. He believed that joint planning 
between the United States and Great Britain wa~ necessary to 
overcome such barriers to mass immigration as transportation, 
housing, financing, and terrorism in Palestine. To facili-
tate this planning, Truman appointed the Secretaries of 
State, War, and Treasury as a Cabinet Committee on Palestine. 
Most of the Committee's work was done by three alternates -
Henry F. Grady of the State Depar~ment, Goldthwaite H. Dorr 
representing the War Department, and Herbert E. Gaston from 
the Treasury Department. With Grady chairing the trio, the 
alternates went to London on July 10, 1946, to discuss the 
findings of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. (39) 
In London the British proposed a plan which called for a 
Jewish province and an Arab province. Although each province 
was to be basically autonomous, a central government would 
(38) Mohammed Shafi Agwani, Th~ Qni~~£ State~ ~nd th~ 
Arab WorldL 12.15-ll~ (Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic 
Studies, 1955), p. 67. 
(39) See Truman, Me~£iE~· 2:150-51; Acheson, Pres~£~ 
at ~h~ ~tion, p. 174; and Wilson, Decisi££ ££ ~ales~ine, 
p. 92. 
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retain control over some policies among which was immigra-
tion. The British plan advocated the admission of 100,000 
Jews into Palestine only after Jews and Arabs approved the 
entire program. Grady urged the President to accept the plan 
even though the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had 
rejected this alternative. The Ambassador believed that due 
to British resistance this was the only way mass Jewish 
immigration could occur in the near future. Truman recalled 
Grady and his committee, however, when information leaked to 
the press, arousing angry Zionist opp~sition to the proposal. 
Despite Truman's resulting unwillingness to give immediate 
endorsement to the plan, the British published the proposal 
as a joint program which became known as the Morrison-Grady 
Plan. (40) . 
Oppoiition to the Morrison-Grady Plan was widespread. 
The Zionists refused even to discuss the plan with the Bri-
tish, while the Arabs rejected all alternatives other than 
Palestine becoming an Arab country. Public opinion in the 
United States was so opposed to the plan that on August 12, 
1946, Truman informed Prime Minister Attlee of his inability 
to support the proposal. (41) 
Truman's rejection of the M~rrison-Grady Plan virtually 
ended hope for a joint British-American solution to the 
(40) Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 93-94. 
(41) Truman, Memoirs, 2: 152-53. 
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Palestine issue. The Zionists, however, were beginning to 
realize that the 1942 Biltmore Program's goal of Palestine as 
a Jewish State was unrealistic in light of Arab hostility. 
Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of 
the World Jewish Congress, supported by the Jewish Agency 
Executive, began to press for the partition of Palestine. 
Headquartered in London, the Jewish Agency had promoted the 
idea of a Jewish national home since 1929, leading the world-
wide fundraising effort. In Jerusalem the Jewish Agency 
Executive, led by David Ben-Gurion, organized and represented 
the Palestinian Jews. The new Zionist program advocated the 
creation of a Jewish State in part rather than all of Pales-
tine. While Zionists viewed this as a compromise on their 
part, the Arabs disagreed. The fact that the Zionists 
claimed only a part rather than all of Palestine represented 
an unacceptable Arab concession. Despite Arab opposition to 
the proposal, President Truman reacted favorably to the par-
tition plan. (42) 
By September 1946 the Zionist leaders pressured Truman 
to endorse publicly the Agency's partition plan. The State 
Department once more counseled the President to act with 
caution. Henderson and other department officials feared a 
presidential statement would impede the Anglo-Arab negotia-
tions in progress in London. The dissolution of the London 
( 4 2 ) See ·w i ls on , Dec i s ion on P a le~ t in e , pp . 9 4 - 9 6 ; and 
Peretz, Middle §ast Today, p. 274. 
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meetings, however, prompted Truman to act. On October 3 the 
President notified Attlee that he intended to make a state-
ment on Palestine. In his message to the Prime Minister, he 
included the text of a speech he planned to deliver the next 
day, the eve of the sacred Jewish holiday Yorn Kippur. In the 
statement Truman recounted his efforts to achieve a solution 
to the refugee problem, calling again for the admission of 
100,000 Jews. (43) Although he did not actually endorse the 
Jewish partition plan, he expressed the "belief that a solu-
tion along these lines would command the support of public 
opinion in the United States."(44) 
Acheson recalled that Republic~n candidates attacked the 
so-called Yorn Kippur Statement "as a blatant play for the 
Jewish vote."(45) In fact, gubernatorial and Congressional 
election campaigns were raging. Believing that the Republi-
can candidate for governor, Thomas Dewey, was going to sup-
port Zionism publicly, the New York Democrats pressured Tru-
man to issue this statement. Rumors also spread that members 
of the White House Staff, such as Administrative Assistant 
(43) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p .. 97; and Presi-
dent Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October, 1946, FRQ~ 
1946, VII, 703. 
(44) President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October 
3, 19 4 6, FR~ 19 4 6, VI I, 7 0 3. 
(45) Acheson, Present at the fre~tion, p. 176. 
David K. Niles, had influenced the President to help Dernoc-
rats obtain the Jewish vote. (46) 
President Truman defended the Yorn Kippur Statement as 
being "simply a restatement of my position."(47) He 
explained to Prime Minister Attlee that the purpose of the 
~ 
statement was to express America's continued concern for the 
welfare of the d{iplaced Jews in Europe. The President 
reitterated his appeal for the British to increase Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. (48) 
The State Department did not share Truman's narrow focus 
on the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Echoing · 
Henderson's views, Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern 
Division, stated that a worldwide refugee program as well as 
a resolution of the entire Palestine question were both 
neces~ary to achieve the objective of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. Merriam accused the administration of basing its 
Palestine policy on expediency rather than principle. He 
believed that the United States should strive for the inde-
pendence of all Palestine based on an agreement between Arabs 
(46) See Roosevelt, "Partition of Palestine,: p. 12; and 
James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis 
(New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 347. 
(47) Truman, Memoirs, 2:154. 
(48) President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October 
10, 1946, FRU~ 1946, VII, 706-07. 
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and Jews. While Palestine prepared for independence, Merriam 
recommended a United Nations trusteeship. (49) 
In transmitting Merriam's views to Under Secretary Ache-
son, Loy Henderson noted his concern for the direction of 
American policy. The administration's support for the parti-
tion of Palestine made Henderson uneasy, for he questioned 
whether this policy conformed with American principles. 
Despite his misgivings, Henderson forwarded suggestions to 
the administration to aid the government in preparing the 
United States delegation to the United Nations. The United 
States delegation entered the discussions with three position 
papers. The first paper called for the American delegation 
to state United States policy only if another delegation 
raised the question of Palestine. This suggestion reflected 
the inability of the United States to present a detailed 
Palestine program. The second alternative was for the dele-
gation to support strongly a resolution of the Palestine 
issue along Zionist lines. This action would clarify the 
American position on Palestine. The State Department warned 
that this alternative could have serious consequences for 
American economic and strategic· interests in the Near East. 
The third position paper called for the delegation to recom-
mend a moderate plan that did not specifically support parti-
(49) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 99; and 
Gordon Merriam to Loy Henderson, December 27, 1946, FRQ~L 
l.2_1.§., VII, 733-34 .. 
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tion. This plan would attempt to bring about independence 
for the area while providing for the immigration of 100,000 
Jews. The State Department again cautioned that the Arab 
world would probably react unfavorably to this position. If 
the government decided to follow either the second or third 
alternative, however, Henderson and NEA recommended that the 
United States inform both the British and the Zionists of 
America's exact position and its implications. Henderson 
·continued to urge consideration of the entire international 
picture when making decisions on Palestine. (50) 
Despite the efforts of the State Department to provide 
the Truman Administration with policy guidelines, some 
accused department officials of attempting to sabotage the 
President's Palestine policy. Bartley c. Crum, an American 
representative on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
believed that department assurances to the Arab world served 
only to negate Truman's pro-Jewish policy. Crum was espe-
cially critical of Henderson. When asked by the press to be 
more specific in his accusations, Crum stated, "It would be a 
salutary thing if Mr. Loy W. Henderson's resignation were 
requested."(51) NEA and other department offices, in fact, 
had opposed Crum's appointment to the Committee of Inquiry, 
(50) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21, 1946, 
and Merriam to Henderson, December 27, 1946, KRU~L 1946, VII, 
710-13, 732. 
(51) "U.S. Aides Accused on Palestine Issue," New York 
Ii~~' 22 August 1946, p. 8. 
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believing him to be publicity-seeking and untrustworthy due 
to his association with some "United Front" organizations. 
But Henderson never understood why Mr. Crum chose to attack 
him personally. Other critics were more specific with their 
complaints, charging that Henderson was so anti-Soviet that 
he would do anything to bolster the British in the Near 
East.(52) 
Despite the so-called pro-Arab State Department, the 
Arab world's distrust of the Truman Administration's Pales-
tine policy reduced United States prestige in the Near East. 
Arab concern also stemmed from the Zionist activities in 
Palestine. Underground Jewish military organizations such as 
the Haganah and the Irgun conducted terrorist campaigns 
throughout the territory. In addition the Jewish Agency 
Executive was carrying out illegal immigration on a large 
scale. The Arabs viewed these actions as a threat to their 
present safety and to their future existence. In conversa-
tions with Henderson, Arab emissaries urged the United States 
not to confuse the refugee problem with political Zionism. 
They failed to understand how the United States, even in the 
name of humanity,· could reconcile its support of the Jewish 
(52) See Henderson to Lilenthal, Enclosure, March 13, 
1977, LWH Papers; Loy Henderson to Henry F. Grady, September 
7, 1946, Near Eastern Affairs, 1945-48, General File, Con-
tainer 12, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to Mr. Mandel, July 
24, 1946, Near Eastern Substantive File, LWH Papers. 
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minority with the American principle of majority rule. (53) 
In a letter to President Truman, King Ibn Saud wrote, "This 
is the fundamental basis of the whole problem. For the 
principles of democracy dictate that when a majority exists 
in a country, the government of that country shall be by the 
majority, and not the minority."(54) The United States and 
Great Britain were caught in a web of contradictory promises 
and principles. While some hope rested on the United Nations 
to untangle the mess, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, "In 
1947, the grand halls of the U.N. were thick with chickens 
coming home to roost."(55) 
When Great Britain referred the Palestine i~sue to the 
United Nations in April 1947, the Arab states called on the 
General Assembly to end the mandate and to proclaim the inde-
pendent state of Palestine. The proposal failed, and on the 
recommendation of the United States, the United Nations Spe-
cial Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed to invest!-
gate the entire Palestine situation. Composed of eleven 
neutral states, the General Assembly ordered the Committee to 
submit its findings by September. During the UNSCOP investi-
(53) See Forrestal, Di~ries, p. 180; Wilson, ~~cisi££ 
££ Palestin~, p. 67; and memorandum of conversation between 
Marshall, Henderson, and Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, June 17, 
1947, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers. 
(54) Ibn Saud to President Truman, November 2, 1946, 
f~US, !~.!.§., VII, 718-19. 
(55) Schlesinger, Dynamics £!~£Eld ~ewer, vol. 5: The 
Uni~~Q Nations, ed. by Richard C. Hottelet, p. 341. 
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gations, the United States pursued a policy of caution. With 
the Cold War heating up, the State Department did not want to 
risk a loss of American influence or a gain for Soviet pres-
tige in the Near East. (56) 
Although Great Britain was withdrawing from certain 
strategic areas, such as Greece and Turkey, her referral of 
the Palestine question to the United Nations did not indicate 
a desire to leave Palestine. The British merely wanted the 
General Assembly to advise them on administering the Mandate. 
As late as February 1947, they proposed to resolve the situa-
tion by reducing the problem to a local issue between the 
Arabs and Jews of Palestine rather than the world. Fearing 
the opposition which the British proposals would arouse, Loy 
Henderson advised that the United States ref rain from com-
menting on the British program. While the United States and 
Great Britain had common economic and strategic interests in 
the area, the anticipated hostile American public opinion 
toward the proposals fo~ced the State Department to be 
extremely cautious in its support of the British. (57) 
(56) See Wilson, Decisi.£.!! on Palestine, pp. 107-08; and 
George T. Mazuzan, "United States Policy toward Palestine at 
the United Nations, 1947-48: An Essay," frol,2!!~, 7:3 (1975), 
p. 167. 
(57) See Wilson, Decision on fal~tine, p. 105; Loy 
Henderson to Dean Acheson, February 10, 1947, FRUSL !2.!1r V, 
1038-39; and J. C. Hurewitz, The Stru_g_g_le for Palestine (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1976), p. 300. 
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Henderson urged that the United States remain neutral 
during the Special Committee's investigation. He believed 
that serious consideration of the Committee's report required 
United States impartiality. This need for impartiality was 
especially necessary when dealing with the Jewish Agency. 
Henderson feared that any secret conversation with the off i-
cial representatives of the Palestin~an Jews would raise 
suspicion among the Arabs and ruin any chance for the success 
of UNSCOP. He did, however, suggest that the Agency place 
its concerns before the Special Committee. (58) 
The State Department's repeated call for caution, impar-
tiality, and a Palestine policy consistent with the interna-
tional objectives of the government led to public charges of 
anti-Zionism. Viewed as the embodiment of the pro-Arab State 
Department, Loy Henderson, as the Director of NEA, was the 
focus of this criticism. Regardless of his personal feel-
ings, Henderson continued to urge the formulation of an 
acceptable Palestine policy based on cooperation between 
department officials, the President's staff, Congress, and 
interested Americans, including American Jews. He believed 
this was the only approach to formulate a policy that could 
withstand the pressures which were sure to arise during a 
(58) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, May 29, 1947, FRUS, 
1942, v, 1093-94. 
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United Nations debate. (59) Henderson was extremely concerned 
with the increased emotionalism connected to the Palestine 
issue. On January 5, 1948, he wrote to Dr. Ellen Simon in 
Jerusalem, "It seems to me that the situation has developed 
to such an extent that actions are being motivated by emotion 
rather than reason. • " ( 6 0) 
Within the State Department, Henderson continued to pur-
sue the course of reason and to plan for the future of Pales-
tine. A position paper dated June 4, 1947 called for a 
uninational Palestinian state, which was neither Arab nor 
Jewish, that provided equal rights and privileges to all 
citizens. Although not a Jewish National Home in the politi-
cal sense, Palestine would provide a cultural and spiritual 
home for Jews with citizens of all religions participating in 
the governance. Immigration laws would be non-discrimina-
tory. Until the governmental machinery was in operation, the 
plan suggested that the United Nations administer Palestine 
under a trusteeship of ~ither one or more member nations or a 
trusteeship council. The trustee would prepare Palestine for 
self-government and independence. In a discussion with John 
c. Ross, Deputy to United Nations Ambassador Warren Austin, 
(59) see Joseph B. Schechtman, The ~nite£ ~~tes and th~ 
Jewish ~~ate Movement (New York: Herzl Press, 1966), pp. 409-
11; and Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, February 17. 1947, 
KRU~L 1947, v, 1051. 
(60) Loy Henderson to Ellen Simon, January 5, 1948, LWH 
Papers. 
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Henderson stressed that this plan was merely a working paper; 
however, it did indicate the policy which NEA hoped to per-
suade the administration to pursue. (61) 
During the summer of 1947, the State Department's Office 
of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Office of Special 
Political Affairs prepared four alternative plans for the 
future government of Palestine: 1) a uninational state as 
described above; 2) a binational state - one state with 
Jewish and Arab communities; 3) a partition plan calling for 
a Jewish state to consist of the 1,500 square miles in which 
there was a Jewish majority; 4) partition as in plan three 
but to include the 5,000 square miles of the Negev, largely a 
desert area. Neither of the partition plans gave the Jews 
control of areas in which there was an Arab majority. In 
presenting these four plans ·to the Secretary of State, Hen-
derson stated that a uninational state not only represented 
the best international interest of the United States, but it 
also conformed more to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. He realized that this plan was idealistic and 
probably unattainable in light of the hostilities in Pales-
tine. A binational state would also probably be unacceptable 
to Arabs and Jews; however, he expressed concern for the 
problems which would inevitably arise from any form of parti-
(61) "A Plan for the Future Government of Palestine," 
initial draft prepared by Henderson, June 4, 1947, FRU~L 
1947, v, 1096-1100; for notes on Henderson-Ross conversation, 
;;;-footnote, FRUS, 1947, V, 1096. 
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tion. (62) Henderson especially disagreed with plan number 
four since the Negev had an extremely small Jewish population 
and its incorporation in the Jewish State would create what 
he termed "another Polish Corridor."(63) 
Henderson continued to recommend that the United States 
delegation act with caution. He suggested that the govern-
ment withhold any solution until UNSCOP presented its report 
and the British, Jews, and Arabs had expressed their opin-
ions. The United States should then take a position accord-
ing to both the international climate and the results of the 
Assembly debates. Any presentation of United States views 
should be as an elaboration of the proposals of other 
nations. In this way Henderson believed that the United 
States could avoid having the adopted program labeled an 
American plan. (64) 
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine sub-
mitted its report on August 31, 1947. The eleven members 
unanimously agreed to t~rminate the Mandate and grant inde-
pendence to Palestine. The United Nations would maintain 
responsibility for Palestine until independence and also 
protect the Holy Places. The majority of the committee also 
(62) Loy Henderson to George Marshall, July 7, 1947, 
!RU~L 1.2.il• V, 1120-22. 
(63) Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, March 13, 1977, 
LWH Papers. 
(64) Henderson to Marshall, July 7, 1947, FRUSL 1.2.il• v, 
1122-23. 
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agreed that Palestine alone should not bear the entire burden 
of the displaced Jews. The committee split on the nature of 
the government of Palestine. Seven members favored partition 
with economic union. This provided for a Jewish State, an 
Arab State, and an international trusteeship for Jerusalem. 
The committee, however, realized that problems existed with 
any form of partition. Arabs outnumbered Jews two to one, 
and no real territorial separation existed. The majority of 
the committee felt, though, that partition was the solution 
to the urgent problem. At that time almost 18,000 illegal 
immigrants were under British detention, and over 800 Pales-
tinians were incarcerated. The minority report, stating the 
view that partition would only heighten Arab-Jewish separa-
tism and cause irredentism, proposed a federal state. (65) 
Reactions to. the report were varied. Neither plan was 
acceptable to the Arabs, but the Jewish Agency reluctantly 
accepted the partition plan. Public opinion in the United 
States also favored the. majority report. The British, how-
ever, viewed partition as unworkable and unfair. There was 
also opposition to the majority plan in the Pentagon and the 
State Department. (66) 
(65) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 111; and 
William R. Polk, The United ~!~tes and. the ~rab ~orld (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 178-79. 
(66) Wilson, Decision£~ ~alestin~, p. 115. 
Loy Henderson believed it was not in the best interest 
of the United States to support any form of partition or the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, because it 
would alienate the Arab and Muslim worlds at a time when 
their friendship was crucial. In addition, the United 
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States, as an advocate of the plan, would have to provide the 
necessary economic and military aid to implement partition. 
Henderson viewed the plan as unworkable since it was not 
acceptable to both the Arabs and Jews. Without cooperation 
between Arabs and Jews, economic unity would be impossible. 
He believed that the failure to cooperate would result in the 
Palestine question arising again in the United Nations in a 
few years. Henderson also opposed the UNSCOP plan because he 
felt it contradicted the principles of majority rule and 
self-determination. While he believed that the United States 
should insure equality for Jews in Palestine, he did not 
think that either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate 
obligated the United States to aid in the creation of a 
Jewish State. Henderson, therefore, recommended that the 
United States take an impartial position in the upcoming 
United Nations debate. He urged American open-mindedness, 
while directing its efforts toward the agreements necessary 
for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship. This neu-
tral trusteeship would administer Palestine for a stated 
period of time, at the conclusion of which the citizens of 
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Palestine would vote on the partition question. The General 
Assembly would then make its final decision on partition. (67) 
President Truman did not share Henderson's views on 
Palestine. He believed that the UNSCOP plan would encourage 
Arabs and Jews to work together as neighbors. The President 
also felt that it was important to support the efforts of the 
United Nations in Palestine as an expression of confidence in 
that body. Under instructions from Mr. Truman, the United 
States delegation announced its support of the partition plan 
on October 11, 1947. Two days later, the Soviet Union also 
endorsed the plan in what some observers believed was an 
attempt to foster Arab rejection of the Western world. (68) 
Once the United States publicly stated its support of 
partition, Henderson once more tried to formulate an accept-
able policy position in light of the international scene. He 
advised that while the United States delegation should sup-
port the partition plan as instructed, the United States 
should not follow an aggressive policy in the General Assem-
bly, since neither the government nor the American people 
were willin~ to bear the responsibility for the enfo~cement 
of the plan. He believed, however, that a non~aggressive 
(67) Loy Henderson to George Marshall, September 22, 
1947, FRUSL 1947, V, 1154-58. 
(68) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:156-57; and Wilson, Decision 
£~ ~~lesti~~' pp. 122-23. 
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policy would doom the plan to failure at which time the 
General Assembly could reconsider the trusteeship plan. (69) 
The Zionists, however, exerted constant pressure on both 
the United Nations and the White House. While the President 
stated that the United Sta~es should not attempt to influence 
other nations to support _partition, Evan Wilson noted that 
Nahum Goldman and David Horowitz of the Jewish Agency cred-
ited Truman with applying pressure to various delegations. 
According to Robert J. Donovan, members of the White House 
Staff, including Clark Clifford and David K. Niles, as well 
as ·members of Congress, used their positions to influence the 
votes of smaller nations such as the Philippines and Haiti. 
The United States delegation received conflicting instruc-
tions on whether or not to use persuasion on other delega-
tions. Reports of United States pressure tactics caused 
bitterness among the Arab nations. Henderson informed the 
Under Secretary of State, Robert L. Lovett, that his office 
was deeply concerned about the effect that United States 
policy at the United Nations was having on American inter-
national interests, especially in the Arab world. Henderson 
believed that Near East security was vital and that Arab 
friendship was necessary. He also believed that American 
activities in the United Nations were generating mistrust and 
hostility among the Arabs. He again reminded the President 
(69) Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, October 22, 1947, 
FRQ~L 11..11• V, 1195-96. 
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that partition would lead to violence and probably require 
United States military intervention. (70) 
Despite these warnings the administration continued to 
support partition. On November 29, 1947, the General Assem-
bly passed a recommendation to adopt an amended version of 
the UNSCOP proposal. This plan awarded fifty-three percent 
of Palestine to the Jewish State, although Jews owned only 
seven percent of the land in the area. The Palestine Commis-
sion would oversee the partition. The plan delighted Zion-
ists around the world. Arabs responded to the vote the next 
day with the call for a general strike and an attack on Jews 
in Palestine. Henderson informed the Arab world that the 
United States decision to support partition was final and the 
use of violence would not cause the administration to change 
its position. He, therefore, urged the Arabs to accept the 
partition plan. The British reacted to the United Nations 
vote on December 3, when they announced that they would end 
their mandate on May 15~ 1948. (71) 
(70) see Truman, Memoirs, 2:158; Donovan, Conflict and 
Crisis, pp.329-30; Wilson, Decision .912 Palestine, pp. 127-28; 
Ch~;ge Dorsz (Iraq) to George Marshall, .November 5, 1947, and 
Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, November 24, 1947, FRUS, 
1942, v, 1240, 1281-82. 
(71) see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 127-28; 
Memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Foreign 
Minister Jamali (Iraq), December 11, 1947, KRU~ 1947, 
v,1311; Truman, ~oirs, 2:159; and Schlesinger, Dynamics of 
Power, 5:342. 
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The United Nations recommendation to partition Palestine 
insured that United States Palestine policy would be an issue 
in the 1948 election. As in 1946, New York Democratic Party 
leaders called on the administration to take positive action 
on behalf of the Zionist cause in order to enhance the par-
ty's chances in November. Many government officials feared 
the consequences of a foreign policy based on political 
considerations rather than international concerns. James V. 
ForrestAl, the first Secretary of Defense, was especially 
persistent in his quest to remove Palestine from the 1948 
campaign. Although both the President and his opponent, 
Governor Thomas Dewey, agreed with Forrestal in principle, 
neither candidate believed it was possible to remove Pales-
tine from the campaign. Forrestal's growing fear that this 
political issue would irreparably damage American-Muslim 
relations, or even result in war, led him to ask the Secre-
tary of State to speak with Mr. Truman. All of Forrestal's 
efforts, however, were in vain. Democratic Party leaders, 
such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., believed that it was too 
late for the administration to retreat from its position on 
Palestine and that any agreement between the two parties 
would hurt Democratic chances in the election. (72) 
( 7 2) 
Truman to 
1948, p. 
See Clayton Knowles, "Help for Palestine Urged 
Save State Vote," Ne!! Yo_;:~ _!imes, February 21, 
1; and Forrestal, Dia_;:ies, pp. 22, 348, 359-60, 
on 
363. 
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Although Forrestal's attempts to remove the Palestine 
issue from the political arena failed, he continued to speak 
in opposition to the administration's endorsement of parti-
tion. The Arab nations, meanwhile, used American dependency 
on Near Eastern oil as a weapon in an attempt to force the 
administration into a more pro-Arab position. The possibi-
lity of the United States losing access to the oil fields of 
the Near East deeply concerned the Secretary of Defense. (73) 
A more immediate problem was the growing violence 
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Each attack resulted in 
a brutal retaliation. Over one thousand people died from 
violence in Palestine from November 1947 to mid-February 
1948. Neighboring Arab nations prepared to aid their bro-
thers in Palestine. Reports reached Henderson that the gov-
ernments of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq were training soldiers 
to fight in Palestine. There were rumors that some of these 
outside forces were already taking part in the disturbances 
in Palestine. It was avident that implementation of parti-
tion would require force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
(73) See Snetsinger,. Truman, j:__h~ Jewish Vote, pp. 82-83; 
and Forrestal, Diaries, p. 357. 
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already on record as opposing the use of American troops in 
the Near East. (74) 
The continued fear that the United States might be drawn 
into an Arab-Jewish war, as well as the concern for the loss 
of American prestige in the area, led Kennan's Policy Plan-
ning Staff to recommend that the United States refrain from 
any initiative to implement partition. Henderson pointed out 
that the General Assembly's plan was merely a recommendation 
and that peace in the area should be the main objective, not 
implementation of the recommendation. Since partition was 
unworkable in light of Arab hostility, NEA urged the adminis-
tration to withdraw its support. (75) 
These calls for a reevaluation of American Palestine 
policy came at a time when the international situation was 
growing more tense. The·communist take over in Czechoslos-
vakia fueled the fears of Soviet expansion. Peace in Pales-
tine was of great importance in view of United States obliga-
tions in Western Europ~. Unable to stem the mounting 
(74) See memorandum of conversation between representa-
tives of Jewish Agency and Loy Henderson, January 6, 1948, 
and George Marshall to Legation in Syria, February 10, 1948, 
United States Department of State, Foreig_£ Relations of th~ 
~~it~~ Sta~~~L 1948 (Washington, 1976), v, pt. 2, 538, 616; 
"Bad Medicine," Time, 16 February 1948, p. 24; Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to Coordinating Committee, June 21, 1946, FRUS, 
!1iii VII, 632; and Peretz, Middle East Tod~, pp.283-84. 
(75) See George Kennan to George Marshall, January 20, 
1948, and "The Partition of Palestine and United States 
Security," prepared by Samuel Kopper (NEA), January 27, 1948, 
FR~~L !1ii1 V, pt. 2, 546-54, 564-66; and Forrestal, Qiari~.~_, 
p. 3 62. 
117 
violence, the Palestine Commission asked the Security Council 
to intervene, but the United States opposed the idea. With 
the President's consent, Ambassador Warren Austin presented a 
position paper to the United Nations Security Council on 
February 24, 1948. He asserted that while the Security Coun-
cil could interfere in Palestine to maintain peace, it did 
not have the legal authority to enforce partition. The other 
Council members agreed. (76) 
It was becoming increasingly obvious that any attempt to 
impose partition would result in even more chaos. Secretary 
of State George Marshall thus directed Ambassador Austin to 
make a previously authorized statement before the Security 
Council. On March 19, 1948, Austin recommended that the 
Council establish a trusteeship for Palestine in order to 
restore peace and to give Palestinian Arabs and Jews an 
opportunity to work out their differences. The trusteeship, 
however, was not to influence the final political settlement 
in any way. (77) 
Austin's statement brought charges that the State 
Department's position sabotaged the President's policy and 
(76) See Schlesinger, £Y£~ics of WO£l~ Po~, 5:342; 
Snetsinger, TrumanL th~ Jewish Vote, p. 85; and "Message to 
the President," prepared by State Department, February 21, 
1948, FRUS.!.. 1:_948, V, pt. 2, 637-40. 
(77) See Wilson, Decisi.£!! on Palestine, p. 135; and 
George Marshall to Warren Austin, March 16, 1948, and Austin 
statement before Security Council, March 19, 1948, FR~ 
.!1.!~ .. v, pt. 2, 729, 743. 
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raised questions about the loyalty of some department off i-
cials. Members of the White House Staff, especially Clark 
Clifford, claimed that Truman had not given his consent to 
the trusteeship statement or the abandonment of partition. 
Clifford accused the State Department of not serving the 
President properly. Truman was fully aware that the depart-
ment favored a temporary trusteeship. According to Under 
Secretary Lovett, he and Secretary Marshall met with the 
President on March 8 and advised him of the failure of the 
Security Council to accept the partition recommendation. At 
that time Lovett suggested trusteeship as an alternative: 
Mr. Truman instructed them to pursue the trusteeship alterna-
tive only if they could not obtain approval for partition. 
Lovett understandably viewed this as clearance from the Pres-
ident to pursue trusteeship if and when it was necessary. 
Also, the President had reviewed the text of Austin's state-
ment in February and supported the position. (78) Truman 
would later write of the trusteeship proposal: 
This was not a rejection of partition but rather an 
effort to postpone its effective date until proper 
conditions for the establishment of self-government 
in the two parts might be established. 
My policy with regard to Palestine was not a com-
mitment to any set of dates or circumstances; it 
was dedication to the twin deal of international 
obligations and the relieving of human misery. In 
(78) See James G. McDonald, ~ ~iss!on in Israel, 1948-
1951 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951), p. 12; Clifford, 
7."F~~tors Influencing Truman," p. 33; and Donovan, Conflict 
~££ fEis!~' pp. 372-73. 
this sense, the State Department's trusteeship 
proposal was not contrary to my policy. {79) 
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Reaction to the trusteeship proposal was swift. Whether 
he approved Austin's statement or not, the President did not 
appear to be aware that Austin was going to deliver the 
speech on March 19. Only the day before, Truman had assured 
Chaim Wisemann of the Jewish Agency of American support for 
partition. The President was embarrassed after Austin's 
speech, and the Zionists were angry. David Niles of the 
White House Staff called for Loy Henderson's replacement. 
Only the Arab leaders and some moderate Jews welcomed the 
announcement. {80) 
Henderson realized that a trusteeship policy contained 
many of the same pitfalls as partition. There was danger of 
heavy American financial and military involvement in Pales-
tine. Henderson's office believed that the success of the 
trusteeship policy depended on British, Arab, and Jewish 
cooperation. Henderson urged the British to remain in Pales-
tine after May 15 since.their stake in the area was as great 
as that of the United States. He also invited moderate Arabs 
and Jews to the United States to discuss the Palestine situa-
tion.(81) 
(79) Truman, Memoirs, 2:163. 
(80) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p. 36; 
and Wilson, Decision .2E. Palestine, pp. 135-36. 
(81) Loy Henderson to George Marshall, March 24, 1948, 
and Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, March 27 and April 9, 
1948, K~!!~.L .!2.i~.1 v, pt . 2, 156 - 51, 161 - 6 8, 8 o 4 - o 5 . 
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As the date for the end of the British Mandate drew 
near, Henderson became alarmed over the confusion and indeci-
sion in the United Nations concerning the Palestine situa-
tion. He believed that failure of the United States to act 
decisively for a solution to the Palestine problem would 
result in chaos in Palestine when the British withdrew their 
troops. He felt that the administration should seek a truce 
and temporary trusteeship in a confident manner and appeal 
for bipartisan support for a peaceful solution. (82) 
These recommendations, which he made in late April, were 
too late. At 6:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on May 14, 
1948, the provisional government in Palestine proclaimed the 
State of Israel. Eleven minutes later the United States 
issued a statement of de facto recognition. The President 
had considered a proper United States response for some time 
in the event that the Zionists declared a Jewish State. He 
wrote later that though he realized violence would accompany 
the creation of Israel, Zionist preparations indicated that 
they were ready to govern and defend the new state. (83) The 
White House Staff urged immediate recognition. Clark Clif-
(82) Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, April 22, 1948, 
FRUSL lii~.1 V, pt. 2, 840-42. 
(83) See Robert H. Ferrell, "The United States Policy in 
the Middle East," in American Diplomacz in~ New ~E~' ed. 
Stephen D. Kertesz (South Bend: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1961), p. 284; Truman, MemoiE~' 2:164; and for 
description of Jewish preparations for the new State, see 
Wilson, Q~cision _£.!!Palestine, pp. 139-41. 
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ford stated that recognition seemed both in accordance with 
Mr. Truman's overall Palestine policy and an appropriate act 
of humanity. Democratic Party leaders, ever mindful of the 
Jewish vote, also encouraged recognition. At a meeting with 
the President and members of his staff on May 12, Secretary 
of State Marshall urged Mr. Truman not to make a decision 
based on political motives. The President, however, decided 
to recognize the Jewish State immediately upon its proclama-
tion. (84) 
The end of the Mandate marked the beginning of full 
scale war in Palestine. The Arab Legion from Transjordan and 
small forces from Egypt and Iraq moved in to defend Arab 
areas, but they were no match for the well-trained Israeli 
troops. As the Israelis occupied Arab areas, civilians fled 
their homes. The plight of half-million Arab refugees became 
a new United Nations problem. The United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees helped during the first year, but there 
was no solution to the problem. Arab nations refused to aid 
the refugees as the return of the Palestinians to their homes 
was the only alternative acceptable to them. The Israelis 
rejected repatriation of the refugees for obvious security 
reasons since there was no provision for an Arab-Israeli 
(84) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p. 39; 
Wilson, De£ision ££ Palestine, p. 142; and for details of 
meeting see Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vot~, pp. 108-09. 
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peace. Consequently, the new Israeli state solved a Jewish 
refugee problem by creating an Arab refugee problem. (85) 
During the weeks that followed United States recognition 
of Israel, the question arose of American diplomatic repre-
sentation in Israel. In July President Truman appointed 
James G. McDonald to be the government's representative. He 
would later become the first United States Ambassador to 
Israel. In keeping with Truman's unilateral policy toward 
Palestine, McDonald was the President's man in every way, as 
the White House did not consult the State Department about 
the appointment. (86) 
On July 14, 1948, a few days after McDonald became 
United States Representative to Israel, Loy Henderson's ser-
vice as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African 
Affairs ended. The cold warrior, who only a year before had 
been one of the chief architects of Mr. Truman's foreign 
policy, was now an embarrassment to the administration 
because of his opposition to its Palestine policy. He left 
NEA for the less-sensitive role of Ambassador to India. His 
departure from NEA saddened colleagues in the State Depart-
ment and Near Eastern embassies. All understood the pres-
sures and criticisms to which he had been subjected, but they 
(85) See Schlesinger, Dynamics of ~orl£ Pow~, 5:343-44; 
and Arakie, Broken Sword, pp. 76-77. 
(86) McDonald, Mission in Israel, p. 8. 
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praised his fairness, patience, and integrity. (87) In a note 
to William Porter on August 12, 1948, Henderson wrote of his 
stay in Washington, "It was a thankless and almost killing 
job; nevertheless, in spite of the worries involved I rather 
enjoyed the smoke of battle."(88) 
(87) Miscellaneous memoranda and notes, India Appoint-
ment File, Container 8, LWH Papers. 
(88) Loy Henderson to William J. Porter, August 12, 
1948, India Appointment File, LWH Papers. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: 
1945-1948 IN RETROSPECT 
From 1945-1948 "the smoke of battle" was thick for Loy 
Henderson and the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 
but with his appointment to India, Henderson moved out of the 
line of fire. The Director of NEA left a lasting impression, 
however, especially with regard to the Truman Doctrine and 
Palestine policy. The Truman Doctrine was the product of 
many State Department and other administration experts, 
including such prominent officials as Dean Acheson and Clark 
Clifford, but it clearly also bore the stamp of Loy W. Hen-
derson. When Henderson became Director of NEA in 1945, he 
brought with him a knowledge of the Soviet Union surpassed by 
few others. Understanding Soviet goals and motives, he per-
sistently pointed out ~o the adminis~ration the importance 6f 
the Northern Tier to the United States and called for the use 
of economic aid to increase American prestige in the area. 
When, as Henderson predicted, Great Britain could no longer 
meet her obligations, the Director of NEA was a leading 
influence in the development of a program he had proposed for 
almost two years. 
The Truman Doctrine was just one part of a postwar con-
tainment policy which included the Marshall Plan and the 
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North Atlantic Treaty. This policy attempted to produce an 
atmosphere in Europe which was conducive to the growth of 
democracy. The success of this policy is still debated, but 
the subsequent influence of the Truman Doctrine on foreign 
affairs should not be underestima~ed. The President's speech 
called for the preservation.and even expansion of a "way of 
life." The belief in the ~ightness of the "American way" had 
a profound effect on United States foreign policy. (1) 
This policy was not entirely new. The United States had 
opposed totalitarianism in both world wars, but the former 
ally was now the adversary. Some historians have questioned 
the doctrine's success and influence on American postwar 
foreign policy. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. credits the 1948 Tito-
Stalin split for the collapse of the Greek civil war. John 
L. Gaddis asserts that United States policy did not shift 
from European to world concerns until the Korean War. It is 
apparent, though, that the action taken in 1950 would not 
have been as likely if 'the Truman Doctrine had not been 
couched in such broad terms and accepted by the American 
public. President Truman's speech effectively divided the 
world into two opposing camps - one free, the -Other subju-
gated. The doctrine's implied commitment to the containment 
of a perceived communist tyranny set the tone for American 
postwar foreign policy. It firmly drew the battle lines for 
(1) See Gaddis, "Turning Point," p. 391; and Paterson, 
Sovi~~rica.!!. Co.!!.!E.£.!!.~~tion, p. 194. 
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the Cold War. George F. Kennan has noted that the sweeping 
language of the speech was not Henderson's, (2) but the doc-
trine clearly reflected Loy Henderson's belief that the 
United States had to meet Soviet aggression in the Near East 
with a decisive policy of economic and military aid. 
The cooperation between the State Department and the 
Truman Administration during the formulation of the Truman 
Doctrine disappeared in the turmoil of the Palestine affair. 
The same pursuit of American principles and national inter-
ests which had determined Henderson's Greek-Turkish position 
also determined his Palestine position. Viewing the situa-
tion in the context of world affairs and a policy of contain-
ment, he believed that it was dangerous for the United States 
to advocate any position which might lead to the spread of 
Soviet influence or to war in the Near East. Realizing the 
Arab hostility to a growing Jewish presence in Palestine, 
Henderson felt that governmental support of a Jewish State in 
Palestine was not in the best interest of the United States. 
He also believed that an attempt to establish such a state 
was in opposition to the principle of self-determination. 
Despite his misgivings about Truman's Palestine .Policy, Hen-
derson always remained loyal to the President; however, it 
(2) See Gaddis, "Turning Point~" pp. 387, 402; Berle, 
~id~~ of Crisis, pp. 114-15; Freeland, Truman Doctrine and 
McCarthyism, p. 88; Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Truman Doctrine 
~~th; Defense of Freedom," Di:elomatic History 4:2(Spring 
1980): 161; Kuniholm, Cold WaE 1£ Near East, p. 425; and 
Kennan, Me~~' p. 315. 
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was his responsibility as a State Department official to 
present the best advice possible, even if this advice was not 
in accord with Mr. Truman's opinion. He wrote of President 
Truman: 
I felt that he almost desperately desired to 
receive from the State Department the kind of 
advice that he was receiving from his White House 
advisers - advice to the effect that it would be in 
the interest of the United States, regardless of 
the difficulties and dangers involved, for it to 
take the lead in establi~hing a Zionist State in 
Palestine. Unfortunately, we could not with a 
clear conscience give that advice. (3) 
In the end the President adopted policies based upon his own 
deep humanitarian concerns and pressures from members of the 
White House Staff, his political party, and Zionist sup-
porters. 
Loy Henderson was accustomed to the heat of battle which 
he encountered in Washington from 1945-1948. His foreign 
service career had been fraught with disagreements with the 
White House. Called "prematurely anti-Communist". by Time, 
Henderson's dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union and its 
leadership led to his departure from the American embassy in 
Moscow in 1938 and to his appointment to Iraq from the Divi-
sion of European Affairs in 1943. His promotion to India in 
1948 was another case of the White House removing the "embar-
rassment." Through it all Henderson remained a loyal 
(3) Loy Henderson to Frank J. Adler, December 31, 1975, 
Frank J. Adler File, Container 11, LWH Papers. 
public servant, performing his duties to the best of his 
ability. (4) 
Questions concerning Loy Henderson's loyalty arose 
almost thirty years later in Clark Clifford's speech before 
the American Historical Association. Clifford accused Hen-
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derson and NEA of doing everything in their power to block 
Mr. Truman's humanitarian policy in Palestine, supporting the 
pro-Arab position of the British rather than the President. 
Clifford supported his opinion by recounting an argument 
which he claimed occurred between Henderson and Truman on 
March 24, 1948, in which the Director of NEA pushed for a 
Palestine trusteeship rather than partition. (5) 
Clifford's address shocked Henderson both in its charges 
of disloyalty and in its inaccuracies. He was reluctant, 
however, to respond to Clifford's accusations as he had found 
that his words were often misquoted or misrepresented. When 
he answered questions on any topic, Henderson always checked 
his recollections against public documents and with those who 
had been involved in the proceedings. Almost eighty-five 
years old at the time of the Clifford speech, he knew that 
his memory as well as his health·were failing, In a letter 
to Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for United 
Nations Affairs during the Palestine crisis, Henderson 
(4) "Cold Warrior," p. 20. 
(5) Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," pp. 26-7, 
3 6. 
denied having attended the meeting with Truman, George Mar-
shall, and Rusk on March 24, 1948. According to Henderson, 
he attended no meetings with the President in 1948 and cer-
tainly did not argue with him. He also pointed out other 
inaccuracies in the speech such as Clifford's pointing to 
certain documents as the product of NEA when they were in 
fact prepared by other State Department offices. (6) 
It was Clifford's picture of disloyalty that was most 
painful to Henderson. He wrote: 
I, can take criticism for bad judgment, for poor 
performance, and for inadequacy, but attacks on my 
motives and charges of disloyalty and lack of honor 
leave scars that are slow to heal. . (7) 
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Henderson defended the NEA position, stating that its members 
believed their position was in the best long-term interest of 
the United States, Palestine, and world peace. (8) 
Henderson's battle wounds came not only from the biting 
criticism, but also from a sense of having failed in his 
attempt to serve these interests. He believed that the 
United States had violated traditional American principles by 
its involvement in the creation of the Jewish State, but 
(6) See Loy Henderson to Philip c. Jessup, January 23, 
1977, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; Loy 
Henderson to Alfred Lilienthal, March 14, 1977, and Loy 
Henderson to Dean Rusk, November 20, 1977, Lilienthal File, 
LWH Papers, 
(7) Henderson to Lilienthal, March 14, 1977, LWH Papers. 
(8) Ibid. 
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having done so it was obligated to protect Israel and the 
multitude of Jews that had chosen to live there. In 1977, 
however, Henderson looked with sadness at what he termed the 
"hideous thirty-year long nightmare" in the Middle East. ("9) 
The fight in Loy Henderson died slowly, if indeed it 
ever died, but the fire and passion evolved into disappoint-
ment and bitterness. The title "Cold Warrior" had been 
appropriate, as he approached each challenge with a zeal and 
dedication that few could match. His devotion to American 
principles and welfare was unwaivering in any situation. In 
a government motivated by the political and the practical, 
however, Mr. Henderson's ideals were often a stumbling block, 
but he never relinquished them. At the height of his NEA 
battle~, he wrote: 
I must admit that at times during by long connec-
tion with the Department and the Service I find 
myself falling into a state of depression, but it 
seems that something always happens which bucks me 
up again to continue the fight. I use the words 
"the fight" because I feel that unless we in the 
State Department approach the very vital problems 
which we are handling in a fighting spirit, we are 
licked before we have time to display our 
forces. (10) 
Loy w. Henderson fought a gallant fight, but his principles 
and ideals could not protect him from the pol{tical realities 
(9) See Loy ·Henderson to John W. Sutton, July 5, 1974, 
and Loy Henderson to Robert B. Steward, January 9, 1974, 
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Hender-
son to Rusk, November 20, 1977, LWH Papers. 
(10) Loy Henderson to William Benton, October 6, 1947, 
Benton File, LWH Papers. 
of American foreign affairs. Foreign Service and State 
Department officials are expendable when they do not conform 
to the administration's they serve. 
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